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There has been increasing evidence challenging the (subjective) expected
utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Savage 1954). In the
static environment, the Allais Paradox (1953) suggests a failure of the in-
dependence axiom underpinning the received expected utility model. This
failure of expected utility is reinforced by the classical thought experiment
by Ellsberg (1961) which reveals that people generally favor known proba-
bility (risk) over unknown probability (ambiguity). In the dynamic setting,
evidences against dynamic consistency (see Andersen et al., 2011 for a review
on hyperbolic discounting) and neutrality towards the timing of uncertainty
resolution (see, e.g., Chew and Ho 1994, Kahneman and Lovallo 2000) have
cast doubt on the descriptive validity of the widely adopted model of dis-
counted expected utility theory. These accumulating evidences have led a
sizable literature, both theory and experimental, on generalizing the ex-
pected utility model for static settings and the discounted expected utility
model for dynamic settings.
Comprising five chapters, this thesis aims to contribute to the decision
making literature by studying choice under uncertainty and involving time.
The first three chapters are primarily experiment studies with the first two
focusing on decision making in a static setting.
Chapter 1 and 2 introduce difference types of spread in different timeless
environments. In the ambiguity setup where the probabilities are unknown,
different types of spread correspond to different types of partial ambiguity.
chapter 1 examines attitudes towards these variants of partial ambiguity in
a laboratory setting. In the risk setup where the probabilities are known,
Chapter 2 analyzes the risk counterpart to partial ambiguity in terms of
second order risks. In both chapters, we identify different attitudes towards
different types of spread, which shed light on existing models under risk
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and ambiguity. Chapter 3 and 4 extend the analysis to a temporal setting.
We employ an experimental design that can disentangle observed risk pref-
erence from time preference. Our results support separation between risk
preference and time preference, which could be accommodated by Kreps
and Porteus (1978) and Chew and Epstein (1989). Chapter 4 analyzes the
separation between risk preference and time preference in a decision theory
framework. We axiomatize a dynamic mean-variance preference specifica-
tion for diversification of risk across time. The final chapter incorporates
preference over sets of choices in the dynamic setting and delivers a recursive
multiple temptations representation. We provide below individual synopses
for each of the five chapters of my thesis.
Chapter 1: Partial Ambiguity
The literature on ambiguity aversion has relied largely on choices involv-
ing sources of uncertainty with either known probabilities or completely
unknown probabilities. Chapter 1 investigates attitude towards partial am-
biguity using different decks of 100 cards composed of either red or black
cards. We introduce three types of symmetric variants of the ambiguous
urn in the classical Ellsberg 2-urn paradox: two points, an interval, and two
disjoint intervals from the edges. In two-point ambiguity, the number of red
cards is either n or 100 - n with the rest black. In interval ambiguity, the
number of red cards can range anywhere from n to 100 - n with the rest
of the cards black. In disjoint ambiguity, the number of red cards can be
anywhere from 0 to n and from 100 - n to 100 with the rest black. For
both interval and disjoint ambiguity, subjects tend to value betting on a
deck with a smaller set of ambiguous states more, which could be measured
by the length of the intervals. Interestingly, certainty equivalents (CEs) as-
sessed from disjoint ambiguity for the same size of ambiguity are bounded
from above by the corresponding CEs assessed from interval ambiguity. For
two-point ambiguity, subjects do not exhibit monotone aversion when the
two points spread out to the two end points. We further study attitude
towards skewed partial ambiguity by eliciting subjects’ preference between
betting on a known deck of n red cards with the rest black versus betting
on an ambiguous deck of red cards from 0 to 2n with the rest black. Here,
subjects tend to become ambiguity seeking when the known number of red
vii
cards equals 5, 10 and 20.
The observed choice behavior has implications for existing models of de-
cision making under ambiguity. In fact, most of the ambiguity utility models
tend to focus on the “full ambiguity” case and do not fit naturally when ex-
plaining the attitude towards partial ambiguity. In summary, our overall
evidence in symmetric partial ambiguity suggests a two-stage view, where
the ambiguous events are separated from the events with known probabili-
ties. For skewed partial ambiguity, two-stage non-expected utility may pin
down the ambiguity seeking in small probability by probability distortions.
Chapter 2: Second Order Risk
In the second chapter, we examine attitudes towards two-stage lottery under
similar settings as their ambiguity counterparts in the first chapter. Instead
of partially unknown probabilities, the second order risk is uniformly dis-
tributed over the possible range, thus three types of partial ambiguity in this
risk environment correspond to three variants of mean-preserving spread
in the second order risk. Specifically, they are two-point spread, uniform
spread and disjoint spread. We do not observe consistent aversion to mean-
preserving spread in the second-order risk. In particular, we observe aversion
to mean-preserving spread in two-point spread and uniform spread groups
while affinity to mean-preserving spread in disjoint spread group. More im-
portantly, the overall data rejects a number of theories, including expected
utility; recursive expected utility and recursive rank-dependent utility, to-
gether with their underlying axioms – reduction of compound lotteries, time
neutrality and second order independence. We further conduct structural
estimations of recursive expected utility and recursive rank-dependent util-
ity with various specifications of utility forms and probability weighting
functions, and we find that recursive rank-dependent utility with different
convex probability weighting functions has the best fit.
Chapter 3: Disentangling Risk Preference and Time Preference
Kreps and Porteus (1979) first offer a preference specification which dis-
entangles risk preference and time preference in temporal decision making.
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Chew and Epstein (1989) extend it to incorporate non-expected utility func-
tions. Chapter 3 is an experimental study of the implications of these mod-
els, specifically to separate intertemporal substitution and risk aversion as
observed in Epstein and Zin (1989). In the experiment, subjects make in-
tertemporal allocation decisions on certain amounts of money between two
time points with four types of intertemporal risks: no risk, uncorrelated risk,
perfectly positively correlated risk and perfectly negatively correlated risk.
We find that the allocation behaviors are similar in no risk and positively
correlated risk treatments; and similar in uncorrelated risk and negatively
correlated risk treatments, while the allocations in the first two treatments
differ substantively from that in the latter two treatments. Specifically, there
is a “cross-over”, by which we mean that, relative to latter two treatments,
subjects allocate more money to earlier payment when the interest rate is
low and allocate more money to later payment when the interest rate is high
in the first two treatments. The overall evidence suggests a direct separation
between intertemporal substitution and risk aversion.
Subsequently, we conduct structural estimation of Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Halevy (2008) using their explicitly specified functional forms and the
results also support such a separation. Our study sheds light on the under-
standing of the interplay between risk and time preferences and provides a
novel interpretation for the recent puzzle in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
for recursive expected utility, which they attribute to a certainty effect on
time.
Chapter 4: Diversifying Risk Across Time
The mean-variance model has been a work horse especially in finance for the
modeling of diversification of risks. Chapter 4 axiomatizes a dynamic mean-
variance model to account for preference for diversification of risk across
time. We first identify preference for diversification of risk through a simple
observation: a 50/50 chance of consuming x amount of goods either today
or tomorrow is ideally preferred to a 50/50 chance of consuming x amount
of goods both today and tomorrow or consuming nothing for both days.
We later propose a utility model to capture this preference by permitting
aversion to intertemporal correlation. Our study deviates from the tradi-
tional recursive expected utility as proposed by Kreps and Porteus (1978)
ix
and Epstein and Zin (1989) in the sense that our proposed model is free
from the correlated behavior of preference for early uncertainty resolution
and preference for diversification.
Chapter 5: Dynamic Multiple Temptations
Dynamic inconsistency has been commonly observed in laboratory settings,
namely a decision maker prefers a small payoff today to a larger payoff
some days later while reverses this preference when the same two payoffs
are postponed by the same time. Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) axiomatize
the recursive temptation representation, which can accommodate dynamic
inconsistency through generating a temptation cost from choosing future
consumption instead of the current consumption. We study agents’ behav-
iors subject to multiple temptations under a similar setting, which is the set
of all infinite horizon consumption problems. We embed Gul and Pesendor-
fer (2004) with modified axioms to show the existence of a dynamic multiple
temptations representation. In the end, we provide some examples to illus-
trate how the proposed model deviates from Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) in
explaining individual time preferences, including dynamic inconsistency.
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The classical 2-urn thought experiment of Keynes (1921, p.75) and Ells-
berg (1961) suggests that people generally favor betting on an urn with a
known composition of 50 red and 50 black balls over betting on another urn
with an unknown composition of red or black balls which add to 100. Ells-
berg (1961) further suggests a 3-color experiment in which subjects would
rather bet on red than on black and bet on not red than not black in an
urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls with unknown composition of yellow and
black balls. Such preference, dubbed ambiguity aversion, casts doubt on
the descriptive validity of subjective expected utility and has given rise to
a sizable theoretical and experimental literature (see Camerer and Weber
(1992), Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009)). Notice that the nature of ambigu-
ity in the three-color paradox with drawing red having a known chance of
1/3 versus the chance of drawing yellow (or black) being anywhere between
0 and 2/3 is skewed relative to that in the 2-urn paradox. While experi-
mental evidence corroborating ambiguity aversion for the 2-urn paradox has
been pervasive, the corresponding evidence for the 3-color paradox appears
mixed. In their 1985 paper, Curley and Yates examine different comparisons
involving skewed ambiguity, e.g., an unambiguous bet of p chance of winning
versus an ambiguous bet in which the chance of winning can be anywhere
between 0 and 2p and observe ambiguity neutrality when the p is less than
0.4. This is corroborated by the finding of ambiguity neutrality in the 3-
color urn in three recent papers (Mckenna et al. (2007), Charness, Karni
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and Levin (2012), Binmore, Stewart and Voorhoeve (2012)). Furthermore,
ambiguity affinity for higher levels of skewed ambiguity have been observed
in Kahn and Sarin (1988) and more recently in Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and
Abdellaoui, Klibanoff and Placido (2011). Dolan and Jones (2004) also find
that subjects are less ambiguity averse for skewed ambiguity than moderate
ambiguity though they do not observe a switch from aversion to affinity.
In their 1964 paper, Becker and Brownson introduce a refinement of the
2-urn paradox to the case of symmetric partial ambiguity with the number
of red balls (or black balls) in the unknown urn being constrained to be
in a symmetric interval, e.g., [40, 60] or [25, 75] in relation to a fully am-
biguous urn of [0, 100] and the 50 − 50 urn denoted by {50}. They find
that subjects tend to be more averse to bets involving larger intervals of
ambiguity. This motivates us to examine two additional kinds of symmetric
ambiguous lotteries. One involves only two possible compositions – {n} and
{100−n}. Another kind of symmetric partial ambiguity consists of a union
of two disjoint intervals [0, n] ∪ [100− n, 100].
In this paper, we study experimentally attitude towards symmetric par-
tial ambiguity in Part I and attitude towards skewed ambiguity in Part II.
The observed patterns of behavior in Part I are summarized as follows:
1. For both interval and disjoint partial ambiguity, we observe aversion to
increasing size of ambiguity in terms of the number of possible compositions.
2. The certainty equivalents (CE) of two-point ambiguous lotteries decrease
from {50} to {40, 60}, from {40, 60} to {30, 70}, from {30, 70} to {20, 80},
and from {20, 80} to {10, 90} except for the last comparison where the CE
increases significantly from {10, 90} to {0, 100}. Notably, CE of {0, 100} is
not significantly different from that of {50}.
3. Mean CE of two-point ambiguous lotteries exceeds the mean CE of the in-
terval ambiguous lotteries which in turn exceeds the mean CE of the disjoint
ambiguous lotteries.
The design of Part II relates to what is used in Curley and Yates (1985).
We find that subjects tend to exhibit a switch in ambiguity attitude from
aversion to affinity at around 30% for the known probability. This provides
a rationale for the mixed evidence for ambiguity aversion in the 3-color urn.
Our finding also echoes a further suggestion of Ellsberg described in footnote
4 of Becker and Brownson (1964). “Consider two urns with 1000 balls each.
In Urn 1, each ball is numbered from 1 to 1000, and in Urn 2 there are
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an unknown number of balls bearing any number. If you draw a specific
number say 687, you win a prize. There is an intuition that many subjects
would prefer the draw from Urn 2 over Urn 1, that is, ambiguity seeking
when probability is small.” This intuition has been tested by Einhorn and
Hogarth (1985, 1986) in a hypothetical choice study involving 274 MBA
students. They find that 19% of their subjects are ambiguity averse with
respect to the classical Ellsberg paradox while 35% choose the ambiguous
urn when [0, 0.002] is the interval of ambiguity rather than the unambiguous
urn with an unambiguous winning probability of 0.001.
In the penultimate section of our paper, we shall discuss the implications
of our experimental design and the observed choice behavior for various ex-
isting models of attitude towards ambiguity. In particular, the comparative
behavior of two-point ambiguous and interval ambiguous lotteries which
share the same end points has implications on the idea of viewing ambi-
guity pessimistically in terms of the worst of a set of priors (Wald (1950),
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) as well as its derivatives (Hurwicz (1951),
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004), Maccheroni, Marinacci and
Rustichini (2006), Gajdos et al. (2008), Siniscalchi (2009)). Notice that full
ambiguity [0, 100] can be viewed as a convex combination of interval ambi-
guity [n, 100−n] and disjoint ambiguity [0, n]∪ [100−n, 100]. This property
bears on the idea suggested in Becker and Brownson (1964) and Gardenfors
(1979) to view ambiguity as the second stage distribution of possible com-
positions occurring at an initial stage. This idea has been applied by Segal
(1987) to account for ambiguity aversion and is subsequently axiomatized
in Segal (1990), Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2001, 2006),
Seo (2009) and Ergin and Gul (2009). We also study the implications on
another view of ambiguity in terms of a limited sense of probabilistic sophis-
tication with red and black regarded as being equally likely (Keynes (1921),
Smith (1969)). This dependence of the decision maker’s preference on the
underlying source of uncertainty is more formally discussed in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), Fox and Tversky (1995) and Nau (2001). Chew and Sagi
(2008) offer an axiomatization of limited probabilistic sophistication over
smaller families of events without requiring monotonicity or continuity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents details of
our experimental design. Section 3 reports our experimental findings. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the implications of our experimental findings for a number
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of decision making models in the literature. Section 5 discusses the related
literature and concludes.
1.2 Experimental Design
We use {n} to denote an unambiguous deck with a known composition of
n red cards and 100 − n black cards. A fully ambiguous deck is denoted
by [0, 100]. Let A denote the set of possible compositions in terms of the
possible number of red cards in the 100-card deck. Consider the following
three symmetric variants of full ambiguity described: interval ambiguity
denoted by [n, 100 − n], two-point ambiguity denoted by {n, 100 − n}, and
disjoint ambiguity denoted by [0, n]∪ [100−n, 100]. We further define three
benchmark treatments: B0 = {50}, B1 = {0, 100}, and B2 = [0, 100]. Here,
B1 appears to admit some ambiguity in interpretation. Being either all red
or all black may give it a semblance of a 50 − 50 lottery in parallel with
its intended interpretation as being two-point ambiguous. Interestingly, B2
admits an alternative description as follows. It can first be described as
comprising 50 cards which are either all red or all black while the composition
of the other 50 cards remains unknown. This process can be applied to the
latter 50 cards to arrive at a further division into 25 cards which are either
all red or all black while the composition of the remaining 25 cards remains
unknown. Doing this ad infinitum gives rise to a dyadic decomposition of
[0, 100] into subintervals which are individually either all red or all black.
Part I of our study is based on the following 3 groups of six treatments
(see Figure 1). In each treatment, subjects choose their own color to bet on.
Two-point ambiguity. This involves 6 lotteries with symmetric two-point
ambiguity:
B0 = {50}, P1 = {40, 60}, P2 = {30, 70}, P3 = {20, 80}, P4 = {10, 90},
B1 = {0, 100} .
Interval ambiguity. This comprises 6 lotteries with symmetric interval am-
biguity:
B0 = {50}, S1 = [40, 60], S2 = [30, 70], S3 = [20, 80], S4 = [10, 90],
B2 = [0, 100].
Disjoint ambiguity. This involves 6 lotteries with symmetric disjoint ambi-
guity:
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B1 = {0, 100} , D1 = [0, 10] ∪ [90, 100], D2 = [0, 20] ∪ [80, 100], D3 =
[0, 30] ∪ [70, 100], D4 = [0, 40] ∪ [60, 100], B2 = [0, 100].
As mentioned in the preceding section, APi and ASi (including AB1 and
AB2) share the same end points. At the same time, ASi and ADi (including
AB0 and AB1) have approximately the same size of ambiguity. Our design
enables observation of choice behavior that may reveal the effect of changes
in the size of ambiguity when the end points remain the same and otherwise.
Figure 1.1: Illustration of 15 treatments in 3 groups.1
Part II of our study concerns attitude towards skewed partial ambiguity.
It comprises 6 comparisons between two skewed lotteries: rn = {n} and
un = [0, 2n] where n = 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50. Unlike the case of symmet-
ric ambiguity in Part I, subjects here choose between a risk task and an
ambiguity task always betting on red.
Both Part I and II lotteries delivers either a winning outcome of S$40
(about US$30) or else nothing. To elicit the CE of a lottery in Part I, we use
a price list design (e.g., Miller, Meyer, and Lanzetta, 1969; Holt and Laury,
2002), where subjects are asked to choose between betting on the color of
the card drawn and getting some certain amount of money. For each lottery,
subjects have 10 binary choices corresponding to 10 certain amounts ranging
from S$6 to S$23. The order of appearance of the 15 lotteries in Part I is
randomized for each subject who each makes 150 choices in all. Subsequent
to Part I, we conduct Part II of our experiment consisting of 6 binary choices
with the order of appearance randomized.
At the end of the experiment, in addition to a S$5 show-up fee, each
subjects is paid based on his/her randomly selected decisions in the exper-
iment. For Part I, one out of 150 choices is randomly chosen using dice.
1Interpretation of the figures is the following: the upper red line represents the number
for red cards and the lower black line for black cards, while one vertical blue line represents
one possible compositions of the deck. Also note that {50}, {0, 100} and [0, 100] are limit
cases for different groups.
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For Part II, one subject is randomly chosen to receive the payment based
on one random choice out of his/her 6 binary choices. (see Appendix A for
experiment instructions).
We are aware that our adoption of a random incentive mechanism (RIM)
could be subject to violation of the reduction of compound lottery axiom
(RCLA) or the independence axiom (e.g., Holt, 1986). In Starmer and Sug-
den’s (1991) study of RIM, they find that their subjects’ behavior is inconsis-
tent with RCLA. More recently, Harrison, Martinez-Correa and Swarthout
(2011) test RCLA specifically and their finding is mixed. While the analysis
of choice patterns suggests violations of RCLA, their econometric estimation
suggests otherwise. The use of RIM has become prevalent in part because it
offers an efficient way to elicit subjects’ preference besides being cognitively
simple (see Harrison and Rutstrom 2008 for a review).
We recruited 56 undergraduate students from National University of Sin-
gapore (NUS) as participants using advertisement posted in its Integrated
Virtual Learning Environment. The experiment consisted of 2 sessions with
20 to 30 subjects for each session. It was conducted by one of the authors
with two research assistants. After arriving at the experimental venue, sub-
jects were given the consent form approved by at NUS’ institutional review
board. Subsequently, general instructions were read to the subjects followed
by our demonstration of several example of possible compositions of the deck
before subjects began making decisions. After finishing Part I, subjects were
given the instructions and decision sheets for Part II. Most subjects com-
pleted the decision making tasks in both parts within 40 minutes. At the
end of the experiment, subjects received payment based on a randomly se-
lected decision made in addition to a S$5 show-up fee. The payment stage
took up about 40 minutes.
1.3 Observed Choice Behavior
This section presents the observed choice behavior at both aggregate and
individual levels and a number of statistical findings.
Part I. Summary statistics are presented in Figure 2.2 We apply the Fried-
man test to check whether the CE’s of the 15 lotteries come from a single
2Out of 15 Part I tasks, one subject exhibits multiple switching in one task and another
exhibits multiple switching in three tasks. Their data are excluded from our analysis.
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distribution. We reject the null hypothesis that the CE’s come from the
same distribution (p < 0.001). Besides replicating the standard finding –
CE of {50} is significantly higher than that of [0, 100] (paired Wilcoxon
Signed-rank test, p < 0.001), our subjects have distinct attitudes towards
different types of partial ambiguity. Specifically, for the comparison between
{50} and [0, 100], 62% of the subjects exhibit ambiguity aversion, 33% of
the subjects exhibit ambiguity neutrality, and 5% of the subjects exhibit
ambiguity affinity.
Figure 1.2: Mean switching points for lotteries in Part I.3
The CE’s for the 15 lotteries are highly and positively correlated in rang-
ing from 58.8% to 91.6% (see Table 5 in Appendix B for pair-wise Spearman
correlations). The correlations between risk attitude measured by the CE
for B0 = {50} and ambiguity attitude, measured by the difference in CE’s
between that of B0 and those 14 ambiguous lotteries are generally highly
correlated, between 36.7% and 63.8%, except for B1 = {0, 100} with a cor-
relation of 9.8% (see Table 6 in Appendix B). The pairwise correlations for
the ambiguity attitude towards the 14 ambiguous lotteries are also highly
positive, ranging from 55.1% to 87.3%, except for the correlations with B1
which range from 9.6% to 49.2% (see Table 7 in Appendix B). The corre-
lations identified here are similar to those reported in Halevy (2007), and
suggest a common link between risk attitude and ambiguity attitude ex-
cept for B1, which corroborates the earlier observation that it may admit
an additional interpretation as being almost a 50-50 lottery.
Using the Trend test, we check subsequently whether there is a significant
3Data are coded in terms of the number of times each subject chooses the lottery
over a sure amount in the 10 binary choices. For details, please refer to the experiment
instruction and Table 3 in the appendices.
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trend in each group. This yields the following two observations.
Observation 1 (Interval and disjoint ambiguity): For lotteries related to in-
terval ambiguity, B0, S1, S2, S3, S4 and B2, there is a statistically significant
decreasing trend in the CE’s as the size of AS increases (p < 0.001). For
lotteries related to disjoint ambiguity, B1, D1, D2, D3, D4 and B2, there is
also a statistically significant decrease in the CE’s as the size of AD increases
(p < 0.001).
Moreover, we count the number of individuals exhibiting a clear mono-
tonic behavioral patterns in Observation 1. For the 6 interval ambiguous
lotteries, 24.1% of the subjects have the same CE’s, 25.9% of the subjects
have non-increasing (weakly increasing) CE’s, while none of the subjects has
non-decreasing CE’s. For the 6 lotteries in the disjoint ambiguity, 24.1% of
the subjects have the same CE’s, 20.3% of the subjects have non-increasing
CE’s, and 5.5% of the subjects have non-decreasing CE’s.
Observation 2 (Two-point ambiguity): For lotteries related to two-point am-
biguity, B0, P1, P2, P3, P4, and B1, there is a significant decreasing trend
in the CE’s from B0 = {50} to P4 = {10, 90} (p < 0.001). Interestingly,
the CE of B1 reverses this trend and is significantly higher than the CE of
P4 (paired Wilcoxon Signed-rank test, p < 0.005). Moreover, the CE of B1
is not significantly different from that of B0 (paired Wilcoxon Signed-rank
test, p > 0.323).
At the individual level, for the 6 two-point ambiguity lotteries, 25.9% of
the subjects have the same CE’s, 16.6% of the subjects have non-increasing
CE’s, 31.5% of the subjects have non-increasing CE’s until {10, 90} with an
increase at B1, and 5.5% of the subjects have non-decreasing CE’s. Between
B0 and B1, 44.4% of the subjects have the same CE’s, 31.5% of the subjects
display a higher CE for B0 than that for B1, and 24.1% of the subjects
exhibit the reverse. Between B1 and {10, 90}, 46.3% of the subjects have
the same CE’s, 40.7% of the subjects have a higher CE for B1 than that for
{10, 90}, and 13% of the subjects exhibit the reverse, again corroborating
the potentially ambiguous nature of B1. We would like to point out that
this observed reversal in valuation of the two-point group runs counter to
several models of ambiguity being reviewed in the subsequent section. One
way to address this reversal is to posit that some subjects view B1 and B0
as being similar and assign similar values to their CE’s. This ‘equivalence’
between B0 and B1 is stated as condition a in Table 1 under Subsection
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4.5 summarizing the implications of our data on the descriptive validity of
several models of ambiguity in the literature.
Observation 3 (Across group): The mean CE of the two-point ambiguity
lotteries, P1, P2, P3, P4 and B1, significantly exceeds (p < 0.006) that of the
corresponding interval ambiguity lotteries, S1, S2, S3, S4 and B2 (they have
the same end points). The mean CE of the interval ambiguity lotteries, B0,
S1, S2, S3 and S4, significantly exceeds (p < 0.017) that of the corresponding
disjoint ambiguity lotteries, B1, D1, D2, D3, and D4 (they have the same
number of possible compositions).4
At the individual level, between two-point ambiguity and interval ambi-
guity, 24.1% of the subjects have the same mean CE’s, 55.6% of the subjects
have higher mean CE’s for two-point ambiguity than for the corresponding
interval ambiguity. The rest of 20.4% exhibit the reverse. Between inter-
val ambiguity and disjoint ambiguity, 27.8% of the subjects have the same
mean CE’s, 50% of the subjects have higher mean CE’s for interval ambigu-
ity than that for the corresponding disjoint ambiguity, and the rest 22.2% of
the subjects have the reverse preference. When viewed together, 19.6% of
the subjects have the same mean CE’s for two-point ambiguity, interval am-
biguity and disjoint ambiguity, 29.6% exhibit the pattern of mean CE’s for
two-point ambiguity being higher than that of interval ambiguity, which is
in turn higher than that of disjoint ambiguity, and 1.9% exhibit the reverse
ranking in CE’s.
Part II. Figure 3 summarizes the proportion of subjects choosing the am-
biguous deck. As anticipated, between {50} and [0, 100], a small proportion
of 12.5% choose the latter. When the proportion of subjects choosing the
ambiguous lottery is significantly lower (higher) than the chance frequency
of 0.5, we take the pattern to be ambiguity averse (seeking). Using a simple
t-test of difference in proportions, we arrive at the following observation.
Observation 4 (Skewed ambiguity): Subjects are significantly averse to mod-
erate ambiguity [0, 80] and [0, 100] (p < 0.001 for both cases) and signifi-
cantly tolerant of skewed ambiguity for [0, 10], [0, 20] and [0, 40] (p < 0.002
in each case). There appears to be a switch towards becoming ambiguity
seeking at around [0, 60] (marginally significant at p < 0.105)
4Pairwise comparisons of the CE’s between interval ambiguity lotteries and the cor-
responding two-point ambiguity lotteries with the same end points are not significantly
different. Pairwise comparisons between interval ambiguity lotteries and the correspond-
9
Figure 1.3: Proportion of subjects choosing the ambiguous lottery.5
Analyzing the behavior across all 6 choices, 14.3% of the subjects are
consistently ambiguity averse, 5.4% are consistently ambiguity seeking, and
39.3% are ambiguity averse towards [0, 80] and [0, 100] and ambiguity seeking
towards [0, 10], [0, 20] and [0, 40].
One issue in the experimental studies of ambiguity is that subjects may
feel suspicious that somehow the deck is stacked against them. Such a
sentiment may be a confounding factor when eliciting ambiguity attitude.
In general, a minimal requirement to control for suspicion would appear to
be to let subjects choose which ambiguous event to bet on, e.g., subjects
can choose whether to bet on red or black in the 2-color urn. (Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1985, 1986; Kahn and Sarin, 1988, Abdellaoui et al., 2011;
Abdellaoui, Klibanoff and Placido 2011). For symmetric partial ambiguity in
Part I, we control for the effect of suspicion by letting subjects choose which
color to bet on. The effect of suspicion is expected to be more pronounced for
the lotteries in Part II when subjects only win on drawing a red card. Our
data do not appear to offer strong support for this. In Part I, when facing
full ambiguity [0, 100], 61.1% of the subjects are strictly ambiguity averse,
33.3% are ambiguity neutral, and 5.6% are strictly ambiguity seeking. In
Part II, 87.5% choose {50} over [0, 100] with 12.5% making the opposite
choice. Moreover, a preponderance of subjects exhibit ambiguity affinity in
Part II for three skewed ambiguous lotteries [0, 5], [0, 10], and [0, 20], despite
being required to bet on red. Overall, our evidence does not support a clear
influence of suspicion in our experiment. This contrasts with the finding of
ing disjoint ambiguity lotteries are also not significant.
5For details, please refer to Table 2 in Appendix B.
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significant influence of suspicion for the case of the 3-color urn in Charness,
Karni and Levin (2012) and Binmore, Stewart and Voorhoeve (2012).
Table 8 in Appendix B displays the Spearman correlations in ambiguity
attitude of all 6 decisions. We find the correlation between [0, 100] and [0, 80]
to be highly positive and that the correlation between [0, 20] and [0, 10] is
also highly positive. By contrast, the correlation between [0, 100] and [0, 10]
is marginally significantly negative (p < 0.103) which is compatible with a
good proportion of subjects switching from being ambiguity averse towards
the moderate ambiguity of [0, 80] and [0, 100] to being ambiguity seeking for
[0, 10], [0, 20], and [0, 40].
1.4 Theoretical Implications
This section discusses the implications of the observed choice behavior for
a number of formal models of attitude toward ambiguity in the literature.
One approach involves using a nonadditive capacity in place of a subjective
probability measure in part to differentiate among complementary events
that are revealed to be equally likely (Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989)). In
another approach, attitude towards ambiguity is axiomatized in terms of the
decision maker facing a range of priors and being pessimistic or optimistic
towards them (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Ghirardato, Maccheroni and
Marinacci (2004), Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006), Gajdos et
al. (2008)). While related to the multiple priors approach, Siniscalchi’s
(2009) vector expected utility model is formally distinct. A different ax-
iomatic approach involves evaluating an ambiguous lottery in a two-stage
manner (Segal (1987, 1990), Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), Nau
(2006), Seo (2009), Ergin and Gul (2009)). A related approach is evident in
Chew and Sagi’s (2008) axiomatization of source preference exhibiting lim-
ited probabilistic sophistication in distinguishing between ambiguous states
from the unambiguous states.
To facilitate our analysis, we impose the following behavioral assump-
tions:
Symmetry (Part I): For treatment i ∈ {B0, ..., P1, ..., S1, ..., D1, ...}, the de-
cision maker is indifferent between betting on red and black.
Conditional Symmetry (Part II): For treatment un = [0, 2n] with 2n cards
of unknown color, the decision maker is indifferent between betting on red
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and black conditional on not having drawn among the 100− 2n black cards.
For the benchmark SEU model or more generally probabilistic sophis-
tication, the probabilities of the events Ri and Bi always equal 0.5 given
symmetry where Ri and Bi denote the respective events in treatment i. In
particular,
SEUi = v (w) /2 + v (0) /2,
where w denotes the payment should subjects guess correctly. Thus, SEU
predicts that all lotteries in Part I have the same CEs. For Part II, a similar
argument based on conditional symmetry implies that rn ∼ un for each n.
Both implications are incompatible with the observed behavior.
1.4.1 Non-additive Capacity Approach
One alternative to SEU, dubbed Choquet expected utility (CEU), is to for-
mulate a non-additive generalization by using a capacity in place of a prob-
ability measure (Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler (1989)). Under CEU, the utility
for lottery i is given by:
ν(Ri)v (w) + (1− ν(Ri))v(0) = ν(Bi)v (w) + (1− ν(Bi))v(0),
with ν(Ri) = ν(Bi) from symmetry. In relaxing additivity, the capacities or
decision weights assigned to red (or black) for different Part I lotteries need
not be the same. At the same time, for unambiguous lotteries, we typically
assume that ν is additive over unambiguous events so that ν(R{n}) = n̂,
where n̂ refers to the probability n/100. It follows that CEU can generate
the pattern of behavior in Part I and Part II if ν(·) preserves the observed
ordering. In particular, for symmetric partial ambiguous lotteries, ν(Ri) =
ν(Bi) < 0.5 for i 6= B0, while ν(Run) > n̂ for n less than 30 and ν(Run) < n̂
for n greater than 30 for skewed ambiguous lotteries.
1.4.2 Multiple Priors Approach
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) offer the first axiomatization of the maxmin
expected utility (henceforth MEU) specification in which an ambiguity averse
decision maker behaves ‘as if’ there were an opponent who could influence
the occurrence of specific states to his/her disadvantage. This intuition is
captured by equating the utility of an ambiguous lottery with the expected
utility corresponding to the worst prior in a convex set of priors Π. It is
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straightforward to see that this model can account for the classical 2-urn
Ellsberg paradox. For each treatment i, the corresponding set of priors Πi
can be viewed as the marginal of Π restricted to {Ri, Bi}. For the Part I
lotteries, indifference between betting on red and on black implies that each
marginal Πi is symmetric. In the balance of this subsection, we shall be
using the subscript i to refer to specific marginals where it applies.
The MEU of lottery i is given by:6
minµ∈Πi µ (Ri) v (w) = minµ∈Πi µ (Bi) v (w) .
It follows that B0  P1  P2  P3  P4  B1, B0  S1  S2  S3  S4 
B2 and B1 ∼ D1 ∼ D2 ∼ D3 ∼ D4 ∼ B2 if we require Πi to depend only
on the end points of the set of possible compositions. This contradicts our
Observations 1, 2 and 3. Without any restriction on the sets of priors, MEU
can account for the observed behavior with a judicious choice of the worst
prior for each ambiguous lottery.
For Part II, MEU implies that rn  un under conditional symmetry,
which is incompatible with the observed affinity for sufficiently skewed am-
biguity (Observation 4).
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) axiomatize the α-MEU
model as a linear combination of maxmin EU and maxmax EU. Their rep-
resentation, adapted to our setting, is as follows:
αi minµ∈Πi µ (Ri) v (w) + (1− αi) maxµ′∈Πi µ′ (Ri) v (w) .7
Besides inheriting most of the properties of MEU, the implications of α-MEU
depend on the behavior of αi. In particular, the case of this representation
with a constant α is axiomatized in the same paper. Suppose α is fixed
while Πi is end-point dependent, MEU and α-MEU would have the same
implications for Part I and Part II as long as α > 0.5. Like CEU, without
further restrictions on α, this model can account all our observed patterns.
Specifically, to account for the aversion to increasing size of ambiguity in the
disjoint group [0, n]∪[100− n, 100], α would need to be increasing in the size
of ambiguity. At the same time, to accommodate the observed switch from
ambiguity affinity to aversion for the skewed ambiguous lottery um in Part
II, α would need to be increasing in the degree of skewness m. Gajdos, et
6Since the utility with µ (R) and µ (B) are the same given symmetry, we use only µ (R)
in our subsequent exposition. We also adopt the normalization of v (0) = 0.
7The case of this representation with a constant α is also axiomatized in Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004).
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al. (2008) have axiomatized a closely related model, called a ”contraction”
model, which delivers a weighted combination between SEU and MEU, and
the implications would be similar to those of MEU and α-MEU.
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) propose an alternative gen-
eralization of MEU called Variational Preference (VP) as follows:
minµ∈∆ {µ (Ri) v (w) + ci (µ)} ,
where ci (µ) : ∆ (S) → [0,∞) is an index of ambiguity aversion. They
show that VP could be reduced to MEU if ci is an indicator function for
Πi. If we restrict ci to be the same for all lotteries, then it will imply all
lotteries in Part I are the same, which is obviously implausible. Without
further restrictions on ci, there are few testable predictions besides VP be-
ing globally ambiguity averse which is incompatible with the incidence of
ambiguity affinity in Part II. One intermediate case is to make ci and cj the
same conditioning on the priors that are common to i and j, while ci and cj
each becomes unbounded when the underlying prior does not belong to the
respective sets of priors. In this case, we have:
min {V P ([n, 100− n]) , V P ([0, n] ∪ [100− n, 100])} = V P ([0, 100])
which is not compatible with Observation 1. Another case incorporates
a size-dependent ambiguity index function with ci which becomes smaller
when the size of ambiguity gets larger. In this case, VP can exhibit an
aversion to increases in size of ambiguity in Part I.
Subsequently, Siniscalchi (2009) develops a vector expected utility (VEU)
model which relates to VP and can exhibit ambiguity affinity. In our setting,
the VEU specification is given by:





where ζi is a real-valued adjustment factor for lottery i and A : Rl → R





captures attitude towards different sources of
ambiguity. VEU reduces to a subclass of VP when A is negative and con-
cave. VEU is compatible with the observed behavior in Part I with Ai, the
marginal of A restricted to the dimension of lottery i, being negative and
concave. At the same time, the observed ambiguity affinity in Part II sug-
gests that Ai is positive for values of µ (Ri) that are close to 0. This implies
that VEU requires more than a countable number of marginal adjustment
functions Ai to capture a continual change in attitude towards skewed am-
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biguity [0, 2n] with n varying continuously. While this latter implication is
incompatible with the VEU specification, our data based on a finite number
of observations cannot directly test such a limitation.
1.4.3 Two Stage Approach
The idea of linking ambiguity aversion to aversion to two-stage risks coupled
with a failure of the reduction of compound lottery axiom (RCLA) is evident
in the works of Becker and Brownson (1964) and Gardenfors (1979). This
is formalized in Segal (1987) who proposes a two-stage model of ambiguity
aversion with a common rank-dependent utility (Quiggin (1982), henceforth
RDU) for both first and second stage risks. Maintaining a two-stage setting
without requiring RCLA, several subsequent papers (Klibanoff, Marinacci
and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006), Ergin and Gul (2009), Seo (2009)) provide
axiomatizations of a decision maker possessing distinct preferences across the
two stages to model ambiguity aversion. In a two-stage setting but without
RCLA, observe that having the same preference specification in each stage
implies that B0 and B1 are indifferent.
We shall discuss successively here the implications of our data on adopt-
ing a two-stage approach using both identical and distinct preference specifi-
cations for the two stages. To facilitate our analysis, we impose the following
assumption.
Belief Consistency : Stage-1 beliefs pii for all i in Part I are updated using
Bayesian rule from piB2 , which has the maximal support in terms of the set
of possible compositions.
As it turns out, together with belief consistency, symmetry and condi-
tional symmetry imply uniformity of stage-1 beliefs piA on the set of possible
compositions A for each ambiguous lottery. We offer an induction based ar-
gument as follows. Consider a skewed ambiguous deck [0, 1] in which only
one card has unknown color. Given conditional symmetry, a decision maker
is indifferent between red and black conditioning on this unknown card. This
implies that Stage-1 belief pi[0,1] takes the same value for each possible com-
position {0} and {1}. Similarly, conditional symmetry and belief consistency
implies that pi[0,2] ({0}) equals pi[0,2] ({1}) which in turn equals pi[0,2] ({2}).
This argument can be extended to show that stage-1 belief pi[0,100] assumes
the same value for all possible compositions, i.e., stage-1 beliefs are uniform.
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In the sequel, we discuss the implications of adopting a two-stage approach
using both identical and distinct utility with uniform stage-1 beliefs.
Note that with uniform stage-1 belief, it is straightforward that [0, 100]
could be expressed as a convex combination of [n, 100− n] and [0, n] ∪
[100− n, 100] at stage 1.8 Thus, for preferences satisfying the betweenness
axiom (Chew (1983), Dekel (1986), Chew (1989), Gul (1991)), the CE of
[0, 100] would lie in between those of [n, 100− n] and [0, n] ∪ [100− n, 100].
This is incompatible with Observation 1.
Axiomatizations of two-stage preferences based on non-betweenness pref-
erences have appeared in Segal (1990) with the same specification in both
stages and Ergin and Gul (2009) whose representation discussed below can
accommodate distinct preferences across stages:
Φ (pii) , where cµ = V
−1 (V (w, µ (Ri))) ,
where pii is the induced distribution of pii on the CE of stage-2 risk µ, and
Φ, V are general utility functions (EU or NEU). Segal’s (1987) model corre-
sponds to applying the same RDU specification to both stages of the above
expression. He shows that such a decision maker can exhibit ambiguity aver-
sion under certain restrictions on the probability weighting function. Segal’s
representation is as follows:∫
v (cµ) df (Mi) , where cµ = v
−1 (v (w) f (µ (Ri))) ,
where f is an increasing probability weighting function, cµ is the CE for a
stage-2 risk µ, and Mi is the cumulative distribution function of pii, which
is linear due to uniform belief. Assuming a convex probability weighting
function f, we have the following implications: B0  S1  S2  S3  S4 
B2, B1  D1  D2  D3  D4  B2 and B0 ∼ B1  Pj .
The intuition for these implications is as follows. For the two-point
group {n, 100− n}, as n deviates from 50, the decision weight on stage-2
risk {100− n} becomes f (0.5), which is less than 0.5 given the convexity
of f , thus the evaluation drops at first since the value changes of {n} and
{100− n} relative to {50} are the same when n is close to 50. As n decreases,
this effect is offset by the effect that the value of {100− n} (f (1− n̂) v (w))
increases faster than the value of {n} (f (n̂) v (w)) drops, which is again due
to the convexity of f , thus creating a reversal at last. The minimum point
occurs at n? such that f ′ (1− n̂?) /f ′ (n̂?) = (1− f (0.5)) /f (0.5) , which can
8Assume that the overlapping two points are negligible.
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conceivably be around 10 as in Observation 2.
For the interval group [n, 100− n], the intuition is a bit more compli-
cated: as n deviates from 50, the decision weight on the best stage-2 risk
{100− n} is f (1/ (2n+ 1)), which becomes disproportionately smaller com-
pared to that on the other stage-2 risks. To the opposite, the decision weight
on the worst stage-2 risk {n} is 1− f (2n/ (2n+ 1)) , which becomes dispro-
portionately larger. This effect of changes in decision weights offsets the
effect of increasing value of {100− n}, thus we do not have the reversal
when n approaches 0 as in the two-point group. The intuition for the dis-
joint group is similar.
With the same restrictions on f, we can have rn ≺ un for n small and
rn  un for n large.9 Next, we show by an example that the implications for
across-group comparisons under the same restrictions may fail. Consider the
lotteries [49, 51] and {49, 51} , the difference between these two is that the
decision weight on {50} in lottery [49, 51] is transferred to {49} and {51} in
lottery {49, 51} , and the transferred weight to {51} : f (1/2)−f (1/3) , is less
than that to {49} : f (2/3)−f (1/2) , due to the convexity of f . Thus, similar
intuition as that for the two-point group suggests that [49, 51]  {49, 51} ,
contradicting Observation 3.
This leads us to apply distinct preferences functionals in the Ergin-Gul
specification. To the extent that being able to generate a reversal for the
two-point group is desirable, betweenness conforming preferences for the
second stage can be ruled out. Building on Segal (1987), we can apply
distinct RDU’s in both stage-1 and stage-2 and consider a convex stage-1
probability weighting function f and a piecewise linear stage-2 probability
weighting function g connecting 0 to f (0.5) and f (0.5) to 1. As antici-
pated, this model can account for Observation 1. For across-group com-
parison, the utility for a two-point ambiguous lottery {n, 100− n} becomes
f (0.5) g (1− n̂) v (w) + (1− f (0.5)) g (n̂) v (w) which is constant, and will
be higher than the utility for the interval group [n, 100− n] , which is mono-
tonically decreasing. We may further perturb the function g to be strictly
convex and obtain a reversal in the two-point group such that this model
can accommodate all the observed patterns in our study.
Several recent papers axiomatize a two-stage model involving distinct
EU’s in both stages (DEU) including Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji
9Problem 3 in Segal (1987) provides an example.
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(2005), Nau (2006), and Seo (2009). As observed earlier, DEU is incom-
patible with Observation 1 since independence implies betweenness.10 Oth-
erwise, depending on the relative concavity between the stage-1 and stage-2
vNM utility functions, DEU can exhibit ambiguity aversion or ambiguity
affinity but not their concurrence. With stage-1 utility being more concave,
DEU can account for observed aversion in the two-point group except for
the reversal at B1, but not Observation 3 since it implies that each lottery in
the interval group is preferred to the corresponding lottery in the two-point
group.
1.4.4 Source Preference Approach
Chew and Sagi (2008) axiomatize a source preference model which deliv-
ers probabilistic sophistication within smaller families of events, which they
name as conditional small worlds. Like EU, this model inherently exhibits
RCLA. Within our setting, source preference delivers a one-stage represen-
tation for each of the three benchmark lotteries, B0, B1, and B2, and an
endogenously generated two-stage representation for the various forms of
partial ambiguity in which the set of possible states with known composi-
tion form a conditional small world, typically referred to as risk. The set of
possible states with unknown composition in both the interval and disjoint
groups form another conditional small world. There is a third possible con-
ditional small world corresponding to the case where the cards are either all
red or all black. Here, we demonstrate how the source preference approach
with built-in RCLA can account for the observed choice behavior. In the se-
quel, we shall discuss the implication of relaxing RCLA in conjunction with
adopting a two-stage perspective as is done in the preceding subsection.
Interval Ambiguity ([50− n, 50 + n]): The two end-intervals whose total
length is 100 − 2n are known – half red and half black – while the interval
portion with length 2n is ambiguous, and the lottery induced on the ”known”

















with CEu as the CE functional for the unknown
domain.
10The assumption of second order independence in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji
(2005) has been recently discussed in Epstein (2010) and subsequently in Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci and Mukerji (2012).
18
Disjoint Ambiguity ([0, n] ∪ [100− n, 100]): Either of the two end inter-
vals with length n is ambiguous, while the remainder with length 100−n is
either all red or all black, and the induced lottery on the ”known” domain
would be:
(1− n̂) δc′ + n̂δd,







with CEe as the CE functional for the either
all red or all black domain. Note that c′ > d corresponds to some form
of ambiguity aversion which matches the observed pattern of B1  B2.
Notice that the above expression converges to 0.5δc′ + 0.5δd rather than
δd as n approaches 50. This behavior appears related to the discussion in
Section 2 on the dyadic decomposition of [0, 100] into subintervals which are
individually either all red or all black. For the source model to deliver the
same CE for B2, we need to restrict its evaluation to undecomposed intervals
of ambiguity.
The above implication of discontinuous behavior at n = 50 does not
appear to be compatible with the relatively smooth change of CE for the
disjoint group in the overall data. This suggests a possible explanation
in that subjects may view the size of ambiguity in [0, n] ∪ [100 − n, 100] as
being 2n and correspondingly see 100−2n as being either all red or all black.
This behavior may arise from a decision maker having different valuations
for different decompositions of the full ambiguous lottery. Should subjects
act as if they possess this incorrect understanding, the induced lottery would
be given by:
(1− 2n̂) δc′ + 2n̂δd,
which will converge continuously to δd for the full ambiguity case.
Two-point Ambiguity ({50− n, 50 + n}): The two end intervals whose
total length is 100 − 2n are known - half red and half black - while the
interval portion 2n is either all red or all black, and the induced lottery on










Figure 4 below illustrates different partial ambiguous lotteries on the





For Part I, that source preference has model-free implications of B1 
D1  D2  D3  D4  B2 and Pj  Sj follows from monotonicity in terms
of stochastic dominance. Furthermore, this model can largely accommodate
19
Figure 1.4: Simplicial representation of partial ambiguity.
the rest of the observed choice behavior given a non-betweenness utility func-
tion on the known domain, e.g., RDU and quadratic utility (Chew, Epstein
and Segal (1991)).11 We illustrate this possibility in Figure 4 using a non-
betweenness preference on the known domain. In particular, a quasiconvex
preference functional would also be monotone along the vertical axis (i.e.,
interval group). Furthermore, the top indifference curve can account for
the observed reversal in the two-point group while the bottom indifference
curve illustrates the possibility of Pj  Sj  Dj in Observation 3 under the
misperceived-size-of-ambiguity hypothesis in the disjoint group.
For Part II, the induced lottery is 2n̂δd + (1− 2n̂) δ0 for un, and n̂δw +
(1− n̂) δ0 for its risk counterpart rn. It is straightforward to verify the
concurrence of ambiguity aversion and affinity in Observation 4 can arise
from having either a quadratic utility or a RDU with a probability weighting
function which is initially convex and then linear.
As with the preceding subsection, we can relax RCLA and attempt an
exogenous two-stage approach using source preference to model attitude to-
wards partial ambiguity. One way to do this is to substitute the even-chance
bet 12δw +
1
2δ0 from the known domain by its certainty equivalent c. Doing
this on the simplex shows that preference would be monotone in all three
edges thereby ruling out the possibility of reversal under Observation 2. As
with the RCLA approach above, a non-RCLA source preference model can
11Notice that betweenness implies monotonicity in preference for all three edges, which
is incompatible with the observed reversal for the two-point group.
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account for the behavior in Observations 1 and 3 under the misperception-
of-size-of-ambiguity hypothesis for lotteries in the disjoint group. For Part
II, it is apparent that this non-RCLA approach can also produce the switch
in attitude from aversion to affinity for skewed ambiguity in Observation 4.
Taking a leaf from the two-stage approach in the preceding subsection, we
may consider all possible compositions {n} as equally likely states and obtain
essentially the same model as the one due to Ergin and Gul (2009) which,
in adopting distinct RDU preferences across the two stages, can account for
the behavior in Observations 1 – 4.
1.4.5 Summary
As anticipated, EU fails to account any of the observed behavior. At the
same time, CEU has the flexibility to accommodate all the observed choice
behavior. The implications of our data on the descriptive validity of the
reviewed models based on specific auxiliary assumptions are summarized in
Table 1 below. Both MEU and VP exhibit ambiguity aversion globally and
cannot account for the observed affinity for skewed ambiguity. Over all, for
models under the multiple priors approach, we maintain the hypothesis that
the convex set of priors is fully determined by the end points (condition
b). Consequently, MEU cannot account for how valuations of the disjoint
and the two-point ambiguous lotteries vary according to Observations 1 and
2. This observation also applies to the contraction model (not displayed
separately in Table 1) which, in our experimental setting, behaves essentially
the same as MEU. With a fixed α, the α-MEU model behaves similarly as
MEU. If the value of α can depend on the underlying act, e.g., size and
skewness of ambiguity (condition c), the resulting model can account for
most of the observed choice behavior. While VEU can capture the observed
attitude towards moderate partial ambiguity as well as skewed ambiguity
separately, it cannot in principle account for their concurrence in which
ambiguity affinity can occur at any point {p} over some interval (0, q) for
some q < 1/2 (condition d).
In giving up RCLA but maintaining belief consistency (condition e), the
two-stage approach can account for the patterns of observed choice behav-
ior when the two within-stage preferences are represented by distinct RDU
specifications which do not exhibit betweenness. When both stages have the
same RDU specification, the resulting two-stage model can account for much
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of the observed behavior except for across group comparisons. When both
stages have distinct EU preferences, the two-stage approach has a descrip-
tively invalid prediction that full ambiguity is intermediate in preference
between interval ambiguity and its complementary disjoint ambiguity. The
case of identical EU preference across the two stages coincides with classical
EU under RCLA, and is unable to account for the observed choice behavior.
In treating ambiguous and unambiguous conditional small worlds distinctly,
the source preference approach, which inherently exhibits RCLA, can give
rise endogenously to a one-stage model of B0, B1, and B2, a two-stage model
of partial ambiguity, and accommodate the observed patterns of choice be-
havior under a misperception-of-size-of-ambiguity hypothesis (condition f).
Table 1.1: Summary of implications on models of ambiguity attitude.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
Much of the research following Ellsberg (1961) has tended to focus on am-
biguity aversion in an all or nothing fashion – either fully known or fully
ambiguous (see review in the introduction) with few exceptions, e.g., Becker
and Brownson (1964) and Curley and Yates (1985). In this paper, we intro-
duce novel variants of partial ambiguity, namely two-point ambiguity and
disjoint ambiguity, study attitude towards partial ambiguity experimentally,
and discuss the implications of the observed behavior on a number of mod-
els of ambiguity attitude. Our results contribute to a growing experimental
literature on testing various models of decision making under uncertainty.
Hayashi and Wada (2011) make use of a ‘snakes and ladder’ game and find
evidence against the descriptive validity of MEU. Using a design involv-
ing the two-color urn being drawn twice with replacement, Yang and Yao
(2011) show that both MEU and DEU inherit specific implications which
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are incompatible with observed behavior. Machina (2009) offers several ex-
amples of Ellsbergian variants which are tested experimentally in L’Haridon
and Placido (2010). Their findings are shown in Baillon, L’Haridon, and
Placido (2011) to violate the implications of MEU, DEU, VP, CEU, but
not VEU. Machina (2009) points out that source preference can account for
his examples. Dillenberger and Segal (2012) show that a two-stage NEU
representation can also account for Machina’s (2009) examples.12
Partial ambiguity offers a potentially fruitful avenue to extend existing
models to situations where the information possibilities are incomplete or
conflicting. Consider an example due to Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982):
Consider Miss Julie who is invited to bet on the outcome of three
different tennis matches. As regards match A, she is very well-
informed about the two players. Miss Julie predicts that it will
be a very even match and a mere chance will determine the win-
ner. In match B, she knows nothing whatsoever about the relative
strength of the contestants, and has no other information that is
relevant for predicting the winner of the match. Match C is sim-
ilar to match B except that Miss Julie has happened to hear that
one of the contestants is an excellent tennis player, although she
does not know anything about which player it is, and that the
second player is indeed an amateur so that everybody considers
the outcome of the match a foregone conclusion.
The kind of risks illustrated in this example – match A for known risk,
match B for interval ambiguity, and match C for disjoint ambiguity – seem
representative of what we observe in addition to the entrepreneurial risks
as suggested by Knight (1921). Moreover, attitude towards skewed ambigu-
ity, especially the extreme ones, is of particular interest when one concerns
designing lottery tickets (see Quiggin (1991), for example) such as whether
consumers with skewed ambiguity affinity may prefer pari-mutuel bets over
fixed odd bets. Finally, we note that the notion of partial ambiguity can
be used in domains where ambiguity aversion has been successfully applied,
12Some experimental studies of behavior relating to ambiguity attitude include those
linking it to compound lotteries (Yates and Zukowski (1976), Chow and Sarin (2002),
Halevy (2007), Abdellaoui, Klibanoff and Placido (2011), Miao and Zhong (2012)) and
those linking it to source preference and familiarity bias (Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Chew et al. (2008), Abdelloui et al. (2011), Chew, Ebstein and Zhong (2012)).
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including finance (Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein and Schneider (2008),
Mukerji and Tallon (2001)), contract theory (Mukerji (1998)), and game
theory (Lo (1996), Marinacci (2000)).
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 General Instructions
Welcome to our study on decision making. The descriptions of the study
contained in this instrument will be implemented fully and faithfully.
Each participant will receive on average $20 for the study. The overall
compensation includes a $5 show up fee in addition to earnings based on
how you make decisions.
All information provided will be kept CONFIDENTIAL. Information
in the study will be used for research purposes only. Please refrain from
discussing any aspect of the specific tasks of the study with any one.
1. The set of decision making tasks and the instructions for each task
are the same for all participants
2. It is important to read the instructions CAREFULLY so that you
understand the tasks in making your decisions.
3. If you have questions, please raise your hand to ask our experi-
menters at ANY TIME.
4. PLEASE DO NOT communicate with others during the experi-
ment.
5. Do take the time to go through the instructions carefully in making
your decisions.
6. Cell phones and other electronic communication devices are not
allowed.
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Decision Making Study Part I
This is the first part for today’s study comprising 15 decision sheets each of
which is of the form illustrated in the table below.
Table 1.2: Decision Table
Each such table lists 10 choices to be made between a fixed Option A
and 10 different Option B’s.
Option A involves a lottery, guessing the color of a card randomly drawn
from a deck of 100 cards with different compositions of red and black. If
you guess correctly, you receive $40; otherwise you receive nothing. Different
tasks will have different compositions of red and black cards as described
for each task.
Example 1: This situation involves your drawing a card randomly from
a deck of 100 cards containing red and black cards. The deck, illustrated
below, has either 25 or 75 red cards with the rest of the cards black.
Figure 1.5: Example 1
Example 2: This situation involves your drawing a card randomly from
a deck of 100 cards being made up of red and black cards. The number of
red cards, illustrated below, may be anywhere between 0 and 25 or between
75 and 100 with the rest black.
Example 3: This situation involves your drawing a card randomly from a
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Figure 1.6: Example 2
deck of 100 cards made up of red and black cards. The number of red cards,
illustrated below, may be anywhere between 25 and 75 with the rest of the
cards black.
Figure 1.7: Example 3
The Option B’s refer to receiving the specific amounts of money for
sure, and are arranged in an ascending manner in the amount of money.
For each row, you are asked to indicate your choice in the final “Decision”
column – A or B – with a tick.
Selection of decision sheet to be implemented: One out of the 15 Decision
Sheets (selected randomly by you) will be implemented. Should the sheet
be chosen, one of your 10 choices will be further selected randomly and
implemented.
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Decision Making Study Part II
This is the second and final part for today’s study. In this part, you will
make 6 binary choices. At the end of this part, one of you will be randomly
chosen to receive the outcome of one of his/her decisions, also randomly
chosen, out of the 6 binary choices made.
Example: Consider Option A and Option B below.
Option A: This bet involves your drawing a card randomly from a deck
of 100 cards containing red and black cards. The deck has 25 red cards, and
75 black cards. If you draw the red card, you win $40, otherwise you win
nothing.
Figure 1.8: Example 4
Option B: This bet involves your drawing a card randomly from a deck
of 100 cards containing red and black cards. The number of red cards may
be anywhere from 0 to 50 with the rest of the cards black. If you draw the
red card, you win $40, otherwise you win nothing.
Figure 1.9: Example 5
Please circle your choice: A B
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1.6.2 Supplementary Tables
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of switching points for Part I lotteries.
Table 1.4: Proportion of subjects choosing the ambiguous lottery.
Table 1.5: Spearman correlation of CEs for lotteries in Part I.
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Table 1.6: Spearman correlation of risk attitude and ambiguity attitude in
Part I.
Table 1.7: Spearman correlation of ambiguity attitudes in Part I.





The reduction of compound lotteries axiom (ROCL), which states that deci-
sion maker is indifferent between a compound lottery is valued the same as
its reduced simple lottery applying mixture operation, serves as an implicit
assumption in a number of utility models including expected utility (EU).
Notwithstanding, the empirical validity of ROCL has been challenged. For
instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offer the following example.
• Problem 1. It is a two-stage game. In the first stage, there is a 75%
chance to end the game and get nothing, and a 25% chance to move
into the second stage. Should the second stage be reached, there are
two options. Option A1 is a gamble with an 80% chance of getting
4000 and a 20% chance of getting zero, and option B1 is getting 3000
for sure.
• Problem 2. There are two options. Option A2 is a gamble with a 20%
chance of getting 4000 and an 80% chance of getting zero, and option
B2 is another gamble with a 25% chance of getting 3000 and a 75%
chance of getting zero.
Essentially, Problem 2 is the reduced form of Problem 1, and yet Kah-
neman and Tversky observe that the majority of the decision makers prefer
B1 to A1 in Problem 1 while prefer A2 to B2 in Problem 2, which violates
ROCL.
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Relaxing ROCL, a number of theories have been proposed, including
Kreps and Porteus (1978), Chew and Epstein (1989) and Segal (1990) among
others (see Machina, 1989 for a review). Segal (1990) investigates thoroughly
preference relations over two-stage lotteries, and discusses a number of ax-
ioms related to ROCL. To facilitate the discussion, we review some of key
axioms here. Let X,Y, Z denote simple lotteries, which could also be writ-
ten as {(pi, xi)}i etc. X,Y,Z denote compound lotteries, and δx denotes a
degenerate lottery which yields outcome x for sure. The ROCL states that a
compound lottery {(pi, Xi)}i is the same as the simply lottery
∑
piXi. Re-
laxing ROCL, Time Neutrality Axiom states that a degenerate compound
lottery δX is the same as the compound lottery {(pi, δxi)}i . Naturally ROCL
implies the Time Neutrality Axiom. Moreover, should one want to have EU
in the recursive representation, it would require the Stage-1 Independence
Axiom, which states that X % Y iff αX + (1 − α)Z % αY + (1 − α)Z,
where the mixture operation is applied at only stage 1. Similarly, recursive
betweenness approach would need the Stage-1 betweenness Axiom which
states that X % Y iff X % αX+ (1− α)Y % Y.
Kreps and Porteus (1978) explore preferences in the domain of finite
horizon contingent consumption plans.1 They relax the ROCL and the time
neutrality axiom to obtain a recursive EU representation, which allows dif-
ferent EU functions in different periods. Chew and Epstein (1989) extend
Kreps and Porteus (1978) to allow for non-expected utility (NEU) functions
in different periods. Segal (1990) stays in the atemporal setting and per-
mits a representation with the same rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982;
RDU henceforth) in both stages by relaxing the ROCL and the indepen-
dence axiom at both stages while maintaining the time neutrality. Recently,
Dillenberger (2010) analyzes general two-stage NEU models and links them
to preference for one-shot resolution of uncertainty.
Although a number of theories have been proposed, there is a lack of
systematic examinations of the attitude towards compound risks. The cur-
rent study aims to investigate attitudes towards compound lottery, and to
provide an experimental test for a number of axioms underlying different
1Note that Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Chew and Epstein (1989) work in the tem-
poral setting. Nevertheless, these works could be applied into the atemporal environment
easily.
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models.2 The novelty of our study is to introduce three variants of sym-
metric mean-preserving spread into stage-1 risk: two-point spread, interval
spread and disjoint spread as to be explained below. Our treatments involve
bets on the color of a card drawn in the following 9 cases.
• The 1st treatment has no second order risk, which is a deck of 100
cards with 50 red and 50 black (50r/50b), denoted by {50}. The 2nd
treatment is a deck of 100 cards with equal probabilities of having
40r/60b or 40b/60r (Denoted by {40, 60}), the 3rd treatment is {20,
80}, and the 4th treatment is {0, 100}.
• The 5th treatment is a deck of 100 cards with equal probabilities of
having certain number to red cards ranging from 40 to 60 (Denoted by
[40, 60]). Similarly, the 6th treatment is [20, 80] and the 7th treatment
is [0, 100].
• The 8th treatment is a deck of 100 cards with equal probabilities of
having certain number of red cards ranging from 0 to 40 and 60 to
100 (Denoted by [0, 40]U[60, 100]). The last treatment is [0, 20]U[80,
100].
We classify the lotteries into three groups according to the pattern of
spread (see Figure 1). The two-point spread group includes D1, D2, D3 and
D4; the interval spread group comprises D1, D5, D6 and D7; and the disjoint
spread group is composed of D7, D8, D9 and D4. We confine our design to
only symmetric spreads due to its simplicity. Moreover, symmetric spreads
suffices the purpose of studying various axioms in compound lotteries.
In the figure, the dotted line represents the domain for second order risk,
which is the possible number of red cards, ranging from 0 to 100. Points
or Rectangular above the line illustrate the second order risk. For example,
in treatment 3, which is {20, 80}, we have two points over the line which
represent 20 and 80. In treatment 5, which is [40, 60], the rectangular covers
the range from 40 to 60, and it corresponds to the following two-stage lottery.
ROCL suggests all the lotteries are the same as {50} after reduction due
to the symmetric design in stage-1 risk. Stage-1 independence axiom implies
2Keller (1985) examines the framing effect in the example in Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) cited in the current paper. He finds that the degree of violation ROCL is affected
by the way the decision problem is presented using tubes, decision matrices, or bar graphs.
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Figure 2.1: Three variants of mean-preserving spread in second order risk.
[0,100] lying in between [40, 60] and [0, 40]U[60, 100] since [0, 100] could be
expressed as a mixture of [40, 60] and [0, 40]U[60, 100] at stage 1 (assuming
the overlapping boundaries are negligible).Time neutrality axiom suggests
that {50} is the same as {0, 100} since the risks in them differ only in the
timing of uncertainty resolution.
Overall, we observe aversion to stage-1 two-point spread and interval
spread, while affinity to stage-1 disjoint spread. We also make the following
observations regarding different axioms in compound lottery studies.
1. The ROCL is rejected since we do not observe same certainty equiv-
alents (CEs) for all lotteries.
2. Preference for betting on both [40, 60] and [0, 40]U[60, 100], as well as
betting on both [20, 80] and [0, 20]U[80, 100], to betting on [0, 100] suggests a
contradiction to the stage-1 betweenness (thus stage-1 independence) axiom.
3. Significant difference in CEs between {50} and {0, 100} suggests
different attitudes towards stage-1 risk and stage-2 risk, which negates the
time neutrality axiom.
Lastly, we show that a two-stage RDU model with distinct probability
weighting functions could accommodate the overall behavioral patterns. We
later conduct structural estimations of two-stage EU and two-stage RDU,
and find that two-stage RDU with distinct convex probability weighting
functions fits the data best.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
our experiment design and in section 3 we report the behavioral patterns.
We analyze the implications of different theories in section 4. We conduct
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Figure 2.2: Two-stage Lottery [40, 60].
structural estimations of different models in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
Subjects are presented with 9 lotteries. Each lottery involves guessing the
color of a card randomly drawn from a deck of 100 cards. The exact compo-
sition of each deck is determined as follows: One ticket is randomly drawn
from a bag containing some tickets with different numbers written on them.
The number drawn determines the number of red cards in the deck, and the
rest are black. The stage-1 risk is thus evenly distributed among different
numbers. The 9 decks are described below.3
• D1 - {50}: One ticket is drawn from a bag containing only 1 ticket with
number 50. Hence, the deck contains 50r/50b, which is the reduced
lottery.
Similarly, we have D2({40, 60}), D3({20, 80}), D4({0, 100}), D5([40,
60]), D6([20, 80]), D7([0, 100]), D8([0, 40]U[60, 100]) and D9([0, 20]U[80,
100]). For each Deck, correct bet (before drawing the tickets) on the color
3Deck 1, Deck 4 and Deck 7 were used by Halevy (2007) in addition to the ambiguous
urn.
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of card would deliver S$40 (about US$30) while incorrect bet would deliver
nothing. To elicit the CE of each lottery, we use the price list design (e.g.,
Holt and Laury, 2002), where subjects are asked to choose between betting
on the color of the card drawn and getting some certain amount of money.
For each lottery, subjects have 10 binary choices corresponding to 10 certain
amounts ranging from S$10 to S$22. The order of appearance of the 9
lotteries is randomized for each subject who each makes 90 choices in all.
At the end of the experiment, one out of the 90 choices is randomly chosen
by dice to pay the subject based on her own decision (see Appendix B for
detailed instructions).4
We recruited 109 students using advertisement posted in Integrated Vir-
tual Learning Environment at the National University of Singapore. The
experiment consisted of 4 sessions with 20 to 30 subjects in each session. It
was conducted by the authors and one research assistant. After arriving at
the experimental venue, subjects were given the consent form approved by
at NUS institutional review board. Subsequently, general instructions were
read to the subjects followed by our demonstration of several examples of
compound lotteries in our setting before the subjects began making deci-
sions. At the end, subjects received payment based on a randomly selected
decision made in addition to a S$5 show-up fee. The payment stage took
about 20 minutes, since the construction of compound lottery was compli-
cated. One complete session lasted about 60 minutes.
4Note that this pay 1-in-n method, the so-called Random Incentive Method (RIM),
has been recently examined in relation to the ROCL. Starmer and Sugden (1991) study
the RIM by comparing the 1-in-1 treatment and 1-in-2 treatment and find behaviors
inconsistent with the ROCL. Harrison, Martinez-Correa and Swarthout (2012) test the
violation of the ROCL specifically in this 1-in-n method by comparing it with the 1-
in-1 method. They find evidence against the ROCL in the 1-in-n treatment while not
so in the 1-in-1 treatment, and further urge caution on the usage of RIM in compound
lottery studies. In this current paper, we focus on the patterns towards stage-1 mean-
preserving spread and employ RIM due to its efficiency in eliciting subjects’ preference and
its cognitive simplicity (see Harrison and Rutstrom 2008 for a review). Our analysis only
depends on the within group trends but not one specific comparison between two lotteries.
In fact, Starmer and Sugden (1991) point out that incentive compatibility in RIM depends
on a weaker condition than ROCL: the compound independence axiom, which states that
a compound lottery (X1, p1; . . . ;Xm, pm; . . . ;Xn, pn) % (X1, p1; . . . ;Ym, pm; . . . ;Xn, pn)
iff Xm % Ym. This condition is not violated in this current study as discussed below.
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2.3 Results
This section reports some behavioral patterns at both aggregate and indi-
vidual levels. The summary statistics are presented in Table 1 below.5 The
data are coded in terms of the number of times subjects choose the lottery
over a sure amount in the 10 binary choices, which is in the same order as
the CEs.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of switching point for the lotteries.6
In the following, we first test the violation of the ROCL, then examine
the overall attitudes toward different patterns of stage-1 spread in different
groups, and finally proceed to test some axioms for models studying com-
pound lotteries including the stage-1 betweenness (independence) axiom and
the time neutrality axiom. We use ci to denote the CE of treatment i.
511 subjects out of the 109 subjects have multiple switching points for some decision ta-
bles, which violates first order stochastic dominance. We exclude them for the subsequent
analysis.
6The data is coded as ordered category from 0 to 10 manner based on the switching
point. If subjects choose the certain amount all the time, it is coded as 0; if subjects
choose the gamble in the first choice and the certain amount in the other nine choices, it
is coded as 1; and so on until 10. If the average is 5, the valuation is between SGD15 and
16; if the average is 6, the valuation is between SGD16 and 17; if the average is 7, the
valuation is between SGD17 and 18.
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2.3.1 Test 1: Reduction of Compound Lottery Axiom.
We test whether the subjects assign same CE to all the lotteries, which is
implied by the ROCL. We use the Friedman test to check whether of the
9 treatments come from same distribution. Not surprisingly, we reject the
null hypothesis that come from same distribution (p < 0.001), thus rejecting
ROCL. Moreover, treatment 1, 4 and 7 are used in Halevy (2007), where he
finds that c1(CE of {50})> c4(CE of {0, 100})> c7(CE of [0, 100]). As a
robustness check, we replicate his finding (Trend test across ordered groups,
p < 0.001).
At the individual level, 12 subjects out of 98 subjects have the same
CEs for the 9 lotteries. In addition to these 12 subjects, 39 subjects have
c1 either larger or equal to the CEs of the rest 8 two-stage lotteries, which
suggests that the reduced lottery is weakly preferred to the compound lot-
teries. Moreover, 17 subjects have c1 either smaller or equal to the CEs of
the rest 8 two-stage lotteries, which means they weakly prefer the compound
lotteries than the reduced lotteries.
2.3.2 Test 2: Attitude towards Stage-1 Spread.
For two-point group, we find that c1 > c2 > c3 > c4 (Trend test across
ordered groups, p < 0.042), which means that significant aversion to point-
wise spread is observed. At the individual level, 14 subjects have same CEs,
18 subjects have increasing CEs, 8 subjects have decreasing CEs, and the
rest of the subjects do not exhibit monotone preference for the spread.
For interval group, we find that c1 > c5 > c6 > c7 (Trend test across
ordered groups, p < 0.001), which means that significant aversion to interval
spread is observed. At the individual level, 21 subjects have same CEs, 30
subjects have increasing CEs, 12 subjects have decreasing CEs, and the rest
of the subjects do not exhibit monotone preference for the spread.
For disjoint group, we find that c4 > c9 > c8 > c7 (Trend test across
ordered groups, p < 0.025), which means that significant affinity to disjoint
spread is observed in contrast with the other two groups. At the individ-
ual level, 16 subjects have same CEs, 26 subjects have increasing CEs, 22
subjects have decreasing CEs, and the rest of the subjects do not exhibit
monotone preference for the spread.
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2.3.3 Test 3: Stage-1 Betweenness (Independence) axiom.
We compare c7 (CE of [0, 100]) with both c5 (CE of [40, 60]) and c8 (CE
of [0, 40]U[60, 100]), as well as both c6 (CE of [20, 80]) and c9 (CE of [0,
20]U[80, 100]), since stage-1 betweenness implies c7 lies in between the CEs
of the other two. We find that c7 is significantly lower than both c5 (t-test,
p < 0.001) and c8 (t-test, p < 0.060), as well as both c6 (t-test, p < 0.035)
and c9 (t-test, p < 0.015).
At the individual level, 20 subjects have the same , , and . 44 subjects
have both and higher than , and 26 subjects have the reverse. To allow some
level of choice errors, we further count those individuals with a difference in
CEs that is not less than 2. 23 subjects have both and higher than , and 13
subjects have the reverse. For the second comparison, 23 subjects have the
same , and . 41 subjects have both and higher than , and 27 subjects have
the reverse. Similarly allowing same level of choice errors, 24 subjects have
both and higher than , and 18 subjects have the reverse. This also suggests
the violation of Stage-1 betweenness at the individual level, and thus stage-1
independence is also violated.
2.3.4 Test 4: Time Neutrality axiom.
We test whether c1 (CE of {50}) is the same as c4 (CE of {0, 100}) as implied
by the time neutrality axiom.7 Note that this test also suggests whether the
subjects possess the same attitude toward stage-1 risk and stage-2 risk. We
find that c1 is significantly larger than c4 (t-test, p < 0.022), which implies
that subjects are more averse towards stage-1 risk than the stage-2 risk.
34 subjects have the same CEs. 43 subjects have c1 higher than c4. The
rest of 21 subjects have the reverse. Similarly allowing same level of choice
errors, We find that 33 subjects have c1 higher than c4, and 13 subjects have
the reverse. This suggests the violation of time neutrality at the individual
level.
7ROCL implies time neutrality. Nevertheless, we test time neutrality separately since
all two-stage models with the same utility functions in every stage satisfy time neutrality,
as discussed in the subsequent section.
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2.4 Theoretical Implications
This section analyzes the implications of the observed choice patterns for
different utility theories. As stage-1 risk is uniform and symmetric, any
utility model with the ROCL implies that the 9 treatments are identical.
This is incompatible with our Test 1 on the violation of ROCL. Therefore,
we focus on two-stage utility models, including EU, RDU, weighted utility
(Chew, 1983; WU henceforth) and disappointment aversion utility (Gul,
1991; DAU henceforth) as utility functions at every stage.
We adopt the following notations. For treatment i, let pi (k) denote the
second order objective probability of choosing a random ticket k (ranging
from 0 to 100) from the envelop, which is evenly distributed among the
possible k′s for every i. Given that the number drawn is k, let pik (s) be
the stage-2 probability of drawing the card of color s, where s is either red
or black. We propose the following general form for evaluating two-stage
lotteries:
ci = Φ
−1 (Φ (ν0, pi (0) ; ν1, pi (1) ; ...; ν100, pi (100))) , and νn = U−1 (U (w, pin)) ,
where Φ is stage-1 utility function and U is stage-2 utility function,8
and w denotes the payment that the subjects will receive should they guess
correctly.
2.4.1 Two-stage Expected Utility
Kreps and Porteus (1978) propose recursive EU with different EU in different










where φ is stage-1 utility function and u is stage-2 utility function. De-
pending on the relative concavity between φ and u, we have the following
implication:
Implication 1: subjects are averse to mean-preserving spread in stage-1
risk, i.e., c1 > c2 > c3 > c4, c1 > c5 > c6 > c7 and c7 > c8 > c9 > c4, if and
only if φ is more concave than u, and vice versa.
However, this implication contradicts our observations in Test 2 where
we observe aversion to stage-1 mean preserving spread in two-point group
8Due to our symmetric design of stage-1 risk, the evaluations will be the same regardless
of using pik (R) or pik (B) in the utility function, and thus we use pik (R) from now on and
denote it by pik for short.
9Same EU function in different stages would be equivalent to EU with the ROCL.
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and interval group and affinity to stage-1 mean preserving spread in disjoint
group.
Moreover, recursive EU satisfies the independence axiom in both stages.
In particular, as [0, 100] could be constructed as a convex combination of
[x, 100-x] and [0, x]U[100-x, 100], stage-1 betweenness (and hence indepen-
dence) would imply the following:
Implication 2: CE of [0, 100] lies between the CE of [x, 100-x] and that
of [0, x]U[100-x, 100].
But this contradicts our observations in Test 3.
2.4.2 Two-stage non-Expected Utility
In this subsection, we consider the more general case where Φ and U are
NEU. Due to the same intuition of stage-1 betweenness, we can rule out
the class of utility functions satisfying betweenness (WU, DAU) as stage-1
utility candidates in the class of two-stage NEU models (e.g., Chew and
Epstein, 1989; Dillenberger, 2010).
Segal (1990) axiomatizes a two-stage utility function based on non-
betweenness preferences which essentially permits the same RDU specifi-
cation in each stage, and the CE is given as:∫
u−1
(∫
u (w) f (1− pik) df (1− Pi (k))
)
,
where f is an increasing probability weighting function with f (0) = 0
and f (1) = 1. P is the cumulative distribution function of p,10 and it is
linear due to uniform stage-1 risk. As the utility function permits identical
RDU in each stage, we have the following implication:
Implication 3: c1 = c4.
Note that this holds for all two-stage identical utility functions, but it
contradicts our observations in Test 4. If we additionally impose a convex
probability weighting function, we have the following implications:
1. Aversion to interval spread and affinity to disjoint spread. i.e., c1 >
c5 > c6 > c7 and c7 < c8 < c9 < c4.
2. For point spread, we have c1 = c4 > c2, c3.
11
The intuition for these implications is the following. For two-point group
10Note that a first order lottery (w, pik) first order stochastic dominates (w, pij) if k > j,
thus we can simplify the support of P to be the set of k, ordered from the smallest to the
largest.
11See Appendix A for the detailed derivation.
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{x, 100-x}, as x deviates from 50, the decision weight on {100-x} becomes
f (0.5), which is less than 0.5 due to the convexity of f , and the evaluation
drops initially. As x decreases, this effect is offset by the effect that the
value of stage-2 risk {100-x} increases faster than the value of {x} drops,
which is again due to the convexity of f , and thus creating a reversal at the
end point.
For the interval group [x, 100-x], the intuition is as follows: as x de-
viates from 50, the decision weight on the best stage-2 risk {100-x} is
f (1/ (2x+ 1)), which becomes disproportionally smaller compared to that
on the other lotteries. To the opposite, the decision weight on the worst
stage-2 risk {x} is 1 − f (2x/ (2x+ 1)), which becomes disproportionally
larger.12 The overall effect of this decision weights change offsets the effect
of increasing value of , and thus we do not observe the reversal in this group.
The intuition for the disjoint group is similar and we skip it here.
There are two points we would like to note. Firstly, Segal (1987) has sim-
ilar observations alike aversion to symmetric interval spread based on a more
restrictive probability weighting function besides the convexity assumption,
which is the only restriction in our analysis. The reason for us to get clear
results here is due to the uniform structure of stage-1 risk. Secondly, we
do not consider implication for general probability weighting functions in
this section. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Camerer and
Ho (1994) propose a one-parameter family of probability weighting func-
tion pc/ (pc + (1− p)c)1/c and Prelec (1998) offer an alternative function
exp (− (− ln p)α) . These two functions share a similar shape on the domain
[0, 1], which is initially concave (convex) and then convex (concave) with
a crossing point on the 45 degree line. The pattern for our treatments us-
ing these probability weighting functions is not straightforward. We still
include them in the subsequent estimation section considering their exper-
imental validity in simple lottery studies, and compare them with convex
probability weighting functions.
Since two-stage identical RDU fails in Implication 3, we may consider
stage-1 RDU combined with different stage-2 utility functions.13 Moreover,
12For example, the decision weight on lottery {100-x-i} (i ∈ [0, 100−2x]) can be approx-
imated by (2i+ 1)/
∑
j∈[0,100−2x] (2j + 1) if function f is quadratic. Then, it is straight-
forward to see the disproportional change of decision weights.
13Strictly speaking, Segal (1990) allows for more general preferences over compound
lotteries, including this proposed model and all previously analysed models.
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as there are only two outcomes for all stage-2 risks, stage-2 RDU can provide
the most general pattern compared to stage-2 EU, WU or DAU, as it can
assume different shapes of probability weighting functions. Hence, consid-
ering two-stage distinct RDU would suffice the purpose for accommodating
as many behavioral patterns as possible.
Intuitively, one can consider a linear stage-2 probability weighting func-
tion g (which coincides with stage-2 EU) and a convex stage-1 probability
weighting function f . Then we have the CE of {x, 100-x} monotonically
increasing in x, while for interval and disjoint group, the same intuitions as
before imply that the CE of [x, 100-x] is increasing in x and the CE of [0,
x]U[100-x, 100] is decreasing in x, which fits our overall observed patterns.
In general, stage-1 probability weighting function being more convex than
stage-2 probability weighting function could generate all of the observed
patterns.
Finally, we would like to note that source preference approach could
provide a theoretical account for distinct utility functions in two stages, as
stage-1 risk and stage-2 risk might be perceived as arising from difference
sources of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Fox and Tversky,
1995; Chew and Sagi, 2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Chew and Sagi (2008)
model source preference as having different limited probabilistic sophisti-
cation in small domains but not so across different domains. Their work
provides a general framework for allowing different utility functions (EU,
NEU) in evaluating different stages of risks.
2.5 Model Estimation
In this section, we conduct structural estimation for two-stage EU, of which
EU is a nested model, and two-stage RDU with distinct probability weight-
ing functions, of which two-stage RDU with same probability weighting
function is a nested model.
2.5.1 Model Specification
For two-stage EU, we first consider the power utility function xr. For two-
stage lottery with first order probability density function f, and second
order probability density function f ′, we have the recursive form U =∫ ([∫
xr1df
]1/r1)r2 df ′, where r1 represents the curvature for first order util-
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ity function, and r2 represents the curvature for the second order util-
ity function. Note that REU reduces to EU if r1 = r2, which makes
EU a nested model. The other candidate is the exponential utility func-
tion −e−rx. Similar recursive form is specified as that for power function
U =
∫ − exp(−r2 log [− ∫ −e−r1xdf]−r1) df ′.
For two-stage RDU, we fix the power function xr as the value function
and vary the probability weighting functions. We use the same functional
form with different parameters for two stages. We have four candidates
from one-parameter families. Two exhibit the inverted S-shape: one is CPT
(cumulative prospect theory) function from Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
pc
(pc+(1−pc))1/c ; the other one exp (− (− ln p)
a) is proposed by Prelec (1998).
We also examine two functional forms allowing convexity: pc and cpcp+(1−p) .
The latter form is initially proposed by Rachlin, Raineri and Cross (1991) in
the animal studies of probability discounting. It turns out to be a special case
of two-parameter functional form by Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992),




We adopt probabilistic choice model to conduct structural estimations due to
the binary nature of the data. We first calculate the difference in the utility
of the gamble and that of the certainty as: U (lottery)−U (certainty) , which
is linked to the observed choices with a cumulative normal distribution Φ.
We specify Fechner error as follows (Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008; Hey and
Orme, 1994):
Pr (choosing the lottery) = Φ [(U (lottery)− U (certainty)) /µ] ,
where µ is the “noise” term.14 After we define the probabilistic choice
function, the likelihood function is given by:




ln (ΦU (lottery)− U (certainty)× I (yi = 1))
+ ln (1− ΦU (lottery)− U (certainty)× I (yi = −1))
]
where R represents the parameters to be estimated, and X represents
the lottery parameters, and the indicator function y indicates whether the
14Another popular error structure is U(lottery)
1/u
U(lottery)1/u+U(certainty)1/u
(Luce 1953; Holt and
Laury 2002), which performs worse than the Fechner structure most of the cases in our
data. The contextual rank-dependent utility probabilistic choice model by Wilcox (2011)
would give us the same specification, as the best and the worse of the outcome of our choice
is always fixed as 100 and 0 respectively for all the treatments. Readers are referred to
Wilcox [2008] for a masterful review of the error structure in decision making under risk.
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subject chooses the gamble or the certainty. We use Stata 9 for all the
estimations in this paper.
2.5.3 Estimation Results
The results for two-stage EU are reported in Table 2. We use Clarke test
(Clarke, 2003) and Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) for comparison of non-nested
models. The power function fits the data better than the exponential func-
tion (Clarke test: p < 0.031; Vuong test: p < 0.095). The estimates indicate
that the utility functions are concave for both stage-1 risk (p < 0.001) and
stage-2 risk (p < 0.001). The utility function for stage-1 risk is marginally
more concave than that for stage-2 risk (p < 0.150), which further supports
distinct risk attitude in two stages.
Table 2.2: Estimates for two-stage EU at group level.
The results for two-stage RDU are reported in Table 3. The RRC prob-
ability weighting function fits the data better than other three specifications
including the CPT function (Clarke test: p < 0.001; Vuong test: p < 0.001),
the Prelec function (Clarke test: p < 0.008; Vuong test: p < 0.007), and the
power function (Clarke test: p < 0.003; Vuong test: p < 0.004). In addition,
power function fits better than the CPT function (Clarke test: p < 0.002;
Vuong test: p < 0.103) and the Prelec function (Clarke test: p < 0.018;
Vuong test: p < 0.002).
In the best fit model of RRC probability weighting function, the es-
timated parameter for power value function is 1.271, which is marginally
greater than 1 (p < 0.088). This suggests that the value function is slightly
convex. The estimated parameters for probability weighting functions are
significantly smaller than 1 for both stages (p < 0.001), which suggests a
convex probability weighting for both stages. These findings are also in
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line with that in Wilcox (2011).15 In addition, the estimated parameter for
probability weighting function is significantly smaller for the first stage than
that for the second stage (p < 0.058), which also suggests distinct utility
function in two stages. Moreover, non-linear probability weighting in both
stages rejects models with stage-1 RDU and stage-2 EU. Similar observa-
tions could be obtained if we use power probability weighting function. This
supports distinct probability weighting function for two-stage RDU, which
is in line with our findings in theoretical implications section.
Table 2.3: Estimates for two-stage RDU.16
Finally, we compare the fitness of two-stage EU and two-stage RDU with
RRC. Two-stage RDU with RRC specification fits significantly better than
two-stage EU for both power specification (Clarke test: p < 0.001; Vuong
test: p < 0.001) and exponential specification (Clarke test: p < 0.001; Vuong
test: p < 0.001). This further supports our findings in previous section that
RDU with distinct convex probability weighting function could account for
observed behavior the best.
15Wilcox (2011) finds that subjects with a concave (convex) probability weighting func-
tions also tend to have a concave (convex) valuation function. Moreover only 14 out of 80
subjects exhibit the inverted S-shape probability weighting in the estimation.
16r is the curvature of utility function and w1 and w2 are the parameters for probability
weighting functions of stage 1 and stage 2 repspectively.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we conduct an experiment to study attitudes towards com-
pound lottery by introducing three variants of mean-preserving spread into
stage-1 risk. The design allows us to systematically examine the attitudes to-
wards compound lottery, and to provide an experimental test of a number of
utility models together with their axioms. Overall, we find different stage-1
risk attitudes towards different mean-preserving spread patterns. Specifi-
cally, subjects exhibit aversion towards stage-1 risk mean-preserving spread
in two-point and interval groups, while affinity towards stage-1 spread for
disjoint group. Our observed patterns also suggest the failure of the re-
duction of compound lottery axiom, the time neutrality axiom, the stage-1
betweenness (independence) axiom.
Our work is related to studies on ambiguity (See Camerer and Weber
1992 for a review), especially those linking ambiguity to compound lot-
teries, namely the two-stage approach (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji,
2005; Nau, 2006; Seo, 2009 for two-stage EU. Segal, 1987; Ergin and Gul,
2009 for two-stage NEU). In an experimental study testing the link between
ambiguity and compound lottery, Halevy (2007) incorporates the two-stage
lotteries proposed in Yates and Zukowski (1976) and Chow and Sarin (2002),
in addition to the Ellsberg’s 2-color urn, and shows a positive relationship
between second order risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Subsequently,
Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, Placido (2011) extend the design in Halevy to differ-
ent probabilities of winning for compound lottery and ambiguity. They find
that attitudes towards all three types of uncertainties move from seeking
to aversion as the probability level increases, and partially support the link
between ambiguity and compound risk attitudes. It would be interesting
to extend our experimental design to the setting of ambiguity, and study
theoretical implications when the probability distribution is only partially
known. Recently, Chew, Miao and Zhong (2013) pursue this line of research.
As Segal (1992) explains two-stage lotteries, “There are situations where
uncertainty is resolved in more than one stage. This may be because some
real time elapses between the point when the uncertainty begins to be re-
solved and the point when all the uncertainty is resolved, or because the
decision maker’s concept of uncertainty is multi-stage, even if no real time
is involved.” Here we consider the compound lottery in the atemporal envi-
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ronment in which the two-stage lottery is resolved one stage after another in
at the end of the experiment. One might also investigate attitude towards
compound lotteries when real time is involved. This would be closely re-
lated to the experimental work on preference for early versus late resolution
of uncertainty (Chew and Ho, 1994; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1996), gradual
versus one-shot resolution of uncertainty (Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1996). It
would of interest for further studies to test whether our observed patterns
would be robust when real time is involved between resolving stage-1 risk
and resolving stage-2 risk, and to investigate the connections among stage-1
versus stage-2 risk, early versus late resolution of uncertainty, and gradual
versus one-shot resolution of uncertainty.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Implications for two-stage identical RDU.
1. Two-point Group
We normalize u (w) = 1 and u (w) = 0, and the utility of each lottery is
as follows:
u (c1) = f (0.5) f (0.5) + f (0.5) (1− f (0.5))
u (c2) = f (0.6) f (0.5) + f (0.4) (1− f (0.5))
u (c3) = f (0.8) f (0.5) + f (0.2) (1− f (0.5))
u (c4) = f (1) f (0.5) + f (0) (1− f (0.5))
Note that they can be represented by the general form: f (1− x) f (0.5)+
f (x) (1− f (0.5)) , where x takes the value from 0 to 0.5. Differentiating it
w.r.t x yields −f ′ (1− x) f0.5 + f ′ (x) (1− f (0.5)) .
If f is convex, we have U ′|x=0 = −f ′ (1) f0.5 + f ′ (0) (1− f (0.5)) < 0
since f ′ (1) ≥ (1− f (0.5)) /2 and f ′ (0) ≤ f (0.5) /2. Similarly we can show
the derivative is greater than 0 when x = 0.5. Therefore, the implications
will be c1 = c4 ≥ c2, c3. Note that the comparison between c2 and c3 is
undetermined since we cannot get the exact point where U ′ = 0.
2. Interval Group
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It is not straightforward to make comparisons, but we can make it rela-
tively easier by reforming the above utility representations into a continuous
form: U (α) =
∫ 1−a
a f (s) d − f (1− F (s)) , where α takes the values from
0.5 to 0 for treatments 1, 5, 6 and 7. Since F (s) is the cumulative distribu-
tion function for uniform random variable s, the above can be rewritten as
U (Di) =
∫ 1−a





Let s−a1−2a = y and we will have U (Di) =
∫ 1
0 −f ((1− 2a) y + a) df (1− y) .
Differentiating this expression w.r.t a yields:
U ′ =
∫ 1
0 (1− 2y) f ′ ((1− 2a) y + a) f ′ (1− y) dy.
Evaluating U ′ at a = 0 yields U ′|a=0 =
∫ 1
0 (1− 2y) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy,
and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 U ′|a=0 = 0 and if f is convex, then we have c1 ≥ c5 ≥ c6 ≥ c7.
Proof. We can decompose U ′|a=0 to be
∫ 0.5
0 (1− 2y) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy −∫ 1
0.5 (2y − 1) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy. Observe the symmetry of the two parts in
the integral, hence we can change the variable in the second integral to be
1− y and obtain U ′|a=0 = 0.
For the second statement, since (1− 2a) y + a > y when y < 0.5 and
(1− 2a) y + a < y when y > 0.5 for any a > 0, we have f ((1− 2a) y + a) >
f (y) when y < 0.5 and f ((1− 2a) y + a) < f (y) when y > 0.5. Since we
have
∫ 0.5
0 (1− 2y) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy =
∫ 1
0.5 (2y − 1) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy and f
is convex, changing f ′ (y) to f ′ ((1− 2a) y + a) will increase the LHS and
decrease the RHS, so that we have LHS ≥ RHS. Hence we have U ′ ≥ 0
for any a between 0 and 0.5 and the lemma holds.
3. Disjoint Group
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As before, we rewrite the above into continuous form due to the dif-
ficulty of comparison U (α) =
∫ a
0 f (s) d − f (1− F (s)) +
∫ 1
1−a f (s) d −
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f (1− F (s)) , where a takes the value of 0.5, 0.4, 0.2 and 0 for treatments 4,
9, 8 and 7. Since F (s) is linear: U =
∫ a











Let s2a = y in the first part
s−(1−2a)
2a = y in the second part and and we
have U (Di) =
∫ 0.5
0 −f (2ay) df (1− y) +
∫ 1
0.5−f (2ay + (1− 2a)) df (1− y) .
Differentiating this expression w.r.t a yields U ′ =
∫ 0.5
0 2yf
′ (2ay) f ′ (1− y) dy+∫ 1




′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy+∫ 10.5 (2y − 2) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy, and we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 U ′|a=0.5 = 0 and if f is convex, then we have c4 ≥ c9 ≥ c8 ≥
c7.
Proof. The idea of the proof is the similar to that of the previous Lemma 1.∫ 0.5
0 2yf
′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy = ∫ 10.5 (2− 2y) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy due to symmetry.
For the second part, since we have f (2ay) < f (y) when y < 0.5 and




′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy = ∫ 10.5 (2− 2y) f ′ (y) f ′ (1− y) dy and
f is convex, changing f ′ (y) to f ′ (2ay) will decrease the LHS while chang-
ing f ′ (y) to f (2ay + (1− 2a)) will increase the RHS, hence we have U ′ ≤ 0
for any a between 0 and 0.5 and the lemma holds.
Finally, note that we have the opposite implications for all groups if is
concave.
2.7.2 Experiment Instructions
Welcome to our study on decision making. The descriptions of the study
contained in this experimental instrument will be implemented fully and
faithfully.
Each participant will receive on average $20 for the study. The overall
compensation includes a $5 show up fee in addition to earnings based on
how you make decisions.
All information provided will be kept CONFIDENTIAL. Information in
the study will be used for research purposes only. You are not to discuss
with anyone any aspect of the specific tasks during or after the study.
1. The set of decision making tasks and the instructions for each task
are the same for all participants.
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2. It is important to read the instructions CAREFULLY so that you
understand the tasks and make better decisions.
3. If you have any questions, please raise your hand to ask our ex-
perimenters at ANY TIME.
4. PLEASE DO NOT communicate with others during the experi-
ment.
5. Please take the time to go through the instructions carefully and
make your decisions.
6. Cell phones and other electronic devices are not allowed.
The experiment comprises 9 decision sheets, which are of the form illus-
trated in the table below.
Table 2.4: Decision Table
Each such table lists 10 choices to be made between a fixed Option A
and 10 different Option B’s.
Option A involves lotteries, guessing the color of card randomly drawn
from a deck of 100 cards with different proportions of red and black. If you
guess correctly, you receive $40; otherwise you receive nothing.
In stage 1, You guess the color. The proportion of red and black is
determined in the stage 2 as follows.
In stage 2, You draw one ticket from an envelope containing some tickets
with different numbers. The number you draw determines how many red
50
cards there are in those 100 cards. If the ticket drawn is 0, then the deck
will have 0 red card and 100 black cards. If the ticket drawn is 100, then
the deck will have 100 red cards and 0 black cards. If the ticket drawn is
50, then the deck will have 50 red cards and 50 black cards. Different task
will have different composition of numbers in the envelop.
In stage 3, you will draw randomly one card from the 100 cards as
constructed in stage 2 and if your initial guess is correct, you will receive
$40.
For example, you may guess a color (either red or black) and then draw
a number randomly from 30-70. If the number drawn is 45, this means that
the deck will consist of 45 red cards and 55 black cards. Finally, you draw
a card randomly from the deck, and you receive $40 if your guess is correct,
otherwise you receive nothing.
Option B’s a certain amount of money you can choose to receive, and it
is arranged in an ascending manner in the amount of money.
For each row, you are asked to indicate your choice in the final “Decision”
column – A or B – with a tick.
Selection of decision sheet to be implemented: One out of the 9 Decision
Sheets (selected randomly by you) will be implemented. Should the sheet
be chosen, one of your 10 choices will be further selected randomly and
implemented.







Risk preference and time preference have been in the foundation of economic
analysis. When risk and time are interplayed, the discounted expected utility
(DEU henceforth) has been the most prevalent theory, in which a stream of
contingent consumptions is evaluated as the following∑
t
δtE (u (c˜t)) ,
where δt is the discount factor for period t, c˜t is the random consumption
in period t, and E (u (c˜t)) is the expected utility for period t. When only
risk is involved, the utility index u captures risk aversion; while only time
is involved, the same utility index u captures intertemporal substitution.
Thus, DEU emplyes the same utility index u to capture both risk preference
and time preference, here we challenge this assumption with the following
behavioral intuition.
Consider the following two contingent consumption plans where the un-
certainty is resolved at period t:
Plan A: 50% chance of consuming x at t; otherwise consuming x at t+ 1.
Plan B: 50% chance of consuming x at t and x at t+1; otherwise consuming
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nothing.
Intuitively, these two plans are different and a risk averse decision maker
may prefer A over B since the risks on consumptions are diversified across
two time periods in A while not so in B.1 Nevetheless, DEU predicts indif-
ference between these two plans. To elaborate, as both plans induce risks
over deterministic consumption paths (ct, ct+1) , a decision maker with DEU
first evaluates a deterministic consumption path (ct, ct+1) with separable
additive utility in time: u (ct) + δu (ct+1) ; and then aggregates the certainty
equivalents (CE) of each determinisitic path with expected utility (EU):
Eu (CE (ct, ct+1)) . As one utility index u captures both intertemporal sub-
stitution and risk aversion, DEU fails to generate a difference between A
and B.
This inflexibility in not differentiating risk preference from time prefer-
ence has inspired a number of theories, including Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Chew and Epstein (1990), to relax DEU and disentagle risk preference
and time preference. Originated from Kreps and Porteus’s (1978) study on
temporal resoultion, Epstein and Zin (1989) propose a recursive expected
utility with distinct utility functions separately accounting for risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution. Chew and Epstein (1990) consider instead
non-EU in risk, which is later applied in Halevy (2008) to link diminishing
impatience to certainty effect.
Although much attentions have been paid to the separation of risk aver-
sion and substitution in both theories and applications (see Backus, Rout-
ledge and Zin 2005 for review), few experimental work has been done to
examine the separation and to test the validity of the theories. The pur-
pose of this study is to propose an experimental test on the separation of
risk preference and time preference. Building on the intuition behind our
motivational example, we adopt the experimental design of Convex Time
Budgets (CTB) as in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a; 2012b), where subjects
arie to allocate 100 points between a sooner payment and a later payment
with different interest rates. There are four treatments in our experiment.
1Duffie and Epstein (1992) provide a infinite horizon version of the example as follows.
There are two consumption plans depending on coin toss. In Plan A, one coin is tossed
at t = 1 and if it is head, the consumption is l for all the subsequent periods from 2 to
T, otherwise it is L (L > l) for the subsequent periods. In plan B, T − 1 independent
fair coins are flipped at t = 1, If the tth coin is a head (tail), then the consumption in
that period is l(L). They hypothesize that diversification motives suggest that B may be
strictly preferred to A.
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In the first treatment, both sooner and later payments will be received for
sure (treatment SUR). In the rest three treatments, there are risks in re-
ceiving both payments with different intertemporal correlation patterns. In
treatment with perfectly postively correlated risks (treatment POS), there
is a 50% chance that both payments will be received, otherwise no payment.
In treatment with perfectly negatively correlated risks (treatment NEG),
there is a 50% chance that the sooner payment will be received, otherwise
the later payment will be received. In treatment with uncorrelated risks
(treatment UNC), there is a 50% chance of receiving the sooner payment,
and independently another 50% chance of receiving the later payment. All
the uncertainties are resolved at the end of the experiment to control the
potential preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution.
We find that the allocations are similar in treatments SUR and POS,
and similar in treatments NEG and UNC, while the allocations in treat-
ments SUR/POS differ substantively from that in treatments NEG/UNC.
Specifically, there is a “cross-over” between them, by which we mean that,
relative to treatments NEG/UNC, subjects allocate more points to sooner
payment when the interest rate is low while allocate less points to later
payment when the interest rate is high in treatments SUR/POS.
Our results give rise to implications on different theories, including DEU,
Epstein and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1990) together with some other
behaviroal models which can potentially generate a difference between A
and B (see Fredericgke, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, 2002 for review).2 DEU
predicts that the utilities from the latter 3 treatments are same, and hence
the optimal allocations should be identical. In addition, due to “common
ratio” effect across time (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012b), the optimal allo-
cation in treatment SUR also coincides with that in the latter 3 treatments.
In contrast, both Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy (2008) have good fits
for our aggregate data under certain restrictions. The reason behind, as
we suggest, is the distinction between risk preference and time preference,
and subsequent structural estimations of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy
(2008) on our aggregate data also supports the distinction.
One contribution of our experiment is to the recent experimental works
2Kreps and Porteus (1979) and Chew and Epstein (1990) do not have explicit form
utility functions, and we mainly adopt the forms in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy
(2008) for our subsequent model analysis.
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on risk and time preferences, in particular Andersen et al. (2008), Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a, b). Andersen et al. (2008) adopt multiple price list
(MPL) design to elicit risk and time preference, and use same utility function
to jointly estimate risk and time preference. This approach has been recently
challenged by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), in which they elicit the cur-
vature of utility under risk using MPL and curvature of utility in time using
CTB, and find that the two curvatures are distinct. Subsequently, Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012b) adopt the SUR and UNC treatments and observe the
cross-over behavior as violations of DEU. Overall, the later two studies ob-
serve “risk preference is not time preference”. They further speculate that
the difference is likely due to the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). In contrast, in our experiment, the allocation choices are similar for
SUR and POS treatments, while risk is still involved in POS treatment com-
pared to SUR treatment, which suggests that the observations in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a, b) are not likely due to certainty effect. We later show
that both Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy (2008) provide a theoritical
account for the observatiosn in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We detail experimental
design in Section 2, and analyze the implications of different models in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 reports our experimental results and model estimations,
and section 5 provides discussions on the implications for related literature.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
In this section we describe in details the design of our experiment. We
adopt the CTB design proposed in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a; 2012b).3
In each CTB decision, subjects are given a budget of experimental tokens
to be allocated across a sooner payment and a later payment. We include 2
time menus and four risk-related treatments. For each treatment, subjects
are to make 7 choices with respect to different interest rates. This gives rise
to 56 experimental decisions (2 x 4 x 7).
In each CTB decision, subjects are given a budget of 100 tokens. Tokens
allocated to the sooner date have a value of at while tokens allocated to the
3Harrison and Swarthout (2011) point out that this income-indifference method is pro-
posed in Cubitt and Read (2007), which has been used in the Fill-In-the-Blank literature.
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later date have a value of at+k. In all cases, at+k is SG$0.20 per token and
at varies from SG$0.14 to SG$0.20 per token (SG$1 is about USD0.78). The
daily net interest rates in the experiment vary considerably across the basic
budgets, from 0 to 1.28 percent, implying annual interest rates of between 0
and 2116.6 percent (compounded quarterly), and this is the same for both
menus as the time gap is the same.
We include two time menus. In the first menu, sooner payments are to
be made 1 week from the experiment date, and the later payments are to
be made 5 weeks from the experiment date. We use this front-end-delay to
avoid factors associated with “present” such as transaction cost (Holcomb
and Nelson, 1992). In the second menu, sooner payments are to be made
16 weeks from the experiment date, and the later payments are to be made
20 weeks from the experiment date. We do not fix the early dates the
same in the two menus, as we are to control sub-additivity in eliciting time
preference (Read 2001). The choice of specific dates is set to avoid public
holidays, weekends, and examination weeks.
We also introduce risk into the payment, and there are four risk-related
treatments. In the certainty condition (SUR), both payments will be deliv-
ered for sure. In treatment with perfectly positively correlated risks (POS),
there is a 50% chance that both payments will be received, otherwise no
payment for either sooner or later. In the treatment with perfectly nega-
tively correlated risks (NEG), there is a 50% chance that sooner payment
will be received, and otherwise later payment will be received. In the treat-
ment with uncorrelated risks (UNC), there is a 50% chance that sooner
payment will be received; independently, there is another 50% chance that
later payment will be received. All the uncertainty is resolved at the end of
the experiment to avoid preference for timing of uncertainty resolution.
To increase the credibility of payment (e.g., Anderson et al., 2010), sub-
jects are paid with post-dated cheques which would not be honored by the
local bank when presented prior to the date indicated. To further control the
transaction cost difference in time (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a; 2012b),
subjects receive a $12 minimum payment for participating in two times:
$6 sooner and $6 later, and experimental earnings are added to these $6
minimum payments.
At the end of the experiment, one choice out of the 56 choices is ran-
domly drawn by dices, which is based on the Random Incentive Mechanism
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(RIM). Subjects are told to treat each decision as if it were to determine
the payments they could get. Starmer and Sugden (1991) study the RIM
and test the reduction of compound lotteries axiom (RCLA). They find that
the behaviors of the subjects are inconsistent with RCLA. In a recent study
by Harrison, Martinez-Correa and Swarthout (2011), they test the violation
of RCLA in RIM by comparing it with the 1 in 1 method. The evidence
is mixed for the validity of RIM. Nevertheless, it is simple to understand
and efficient for collecting data, which makes it widely used in experimental
economics.
112 undergraduate students were recruited as participants using adver-
tisement posted in Integrated Virtual Learning Environment at the National
University of Singapore.4 The experiment was done using paper and pencil
at the lab of Center for Behavioral Economics at National University of Sin-
gapore. The experiment was conducted by the authors and one research as-
sistant. The experiment consisted of 4 sessions. After subjects arrived at the
experimental venue, they were given the consent form approved by the Insti-
tutional Review Board at National University of Singapore. Subsequently,
the general instructions were read to the subjects, and we demonstrated one
example before they started making decisions. The experimental instruc-
tions follow closely those in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) (See Appendix
B for Experimental Instructions). Finally, to avoid the possible order effect,
we randomized the order of 8 decision sheets for each of the subjects. Most
of our subjects finished the tasks within 30 minutes. At the end of the ex-
periment, they came to the experimenters one by one, tossed the dices and
got paid (in cheques) based on their choice and luck. On average, subjects
were paid SG$22 including SG$12 show-up fee.
3.3 Model Implications
This section analyzes the implications of different models on the optimal al-
locations in our four treatments, including DEU, Kreps and Porteus (1978),
Epstein and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1990), Halevy (2008) and some
other behaviroal models.
Note that our treatments induce risks over deterministic consumption
4One subject is an exchange student, and will leave Singapore within 20 weeks. We
exclude the subject from the analysis.
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paths (c1, c2) as all the uncertainty are resolved at period 1, and thus a
general utility function for our treatments would be evaluating certain dis-
tribution µ on deterministic consumption paths. In the following theories
discussed, DEU, Epstein and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1990) and
Halevy (2008) assume separable additive utility for deterministic consump-
tion path and differ in the utility for risk.5 DEU assumes EU in risk with the
same utility index as that for time, while Epstein and Zin (1989) maintains
EU but allows for a different utility index. Chew and Epstein (1990) instead
consider non-EU in risk, and Halevy (2008) in an applied work restricts the
utility index for risk to be the same as that for time. In contrast, some
behavioral models discussed below relinquish the separable additivity, like
the habit formation model.
DEU takes the form: Eµ (u (c1) + δu (c2)) , where the utility index for
time and risk coincide. Under DEU, the evalution for SUR treatment is
u (c1) + δu (c2) , while the utilities for the other three treatments are the
same: 0.5 (u (c1) + δu (c2)) . As all the treatments have the same budget
constraint (1 + r) c1 + c2 = 100, DEU predicts that all the optimal solutions
are the same in all treatments. This is the common ratio property over time
as in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
Kreps and Porteus (1978) consider a different utility index in risk. Sub-
sequently, Epstein and Zin (1989) provide an example in which the utility









where α captures risk attitude and ρ captures substitution effect. Note that
when α = ρ, this model reduces to DEU.
Next we characterize the optimal solutions in different treatments for


























is essentially the same as the SUR treatment. For treatment NEG, the utility
5Separable additive utility over deterministic paths is not assumed in Kreps and Proteus
(1978). Nevertheless, this property, if assumed, allows for more tractability of the models
in analyzing consumption-saving behabiors.
6There exists corner solutions if ρ > 1, and this problem persists in other theories. For
example, in Halevy (2008), we also have corner solutions with convex utility function. In























































cα−11 − δα/ρ (1 + r) cα−12
]
= 0,
which does not have an explicit solution. Notice that the function in the first
square bracket corresponds to the FOC of optimization problem in treat-
ments SUR/POS and the function in the second square bracket character-
izes the optimal solution in treatment NEG. Hence, the optimal solution in
treatment UNC would lie in between the optimal solutions in treatments






−1  1 if α < ρ, which will make the optimal solution in UNC
closer to that in NEG.
It is not straightforward to make comparisons among optimal solutions.
Here, we focus on the range of the parameters which make behavioral sense
based on prior literature (Epstein and Zin, 1991), namely α < ρ < 1. Specif-
ically, α < 1 refers to risk aversion while ρ < 1 means positive intertemporal
substitution, and α < ρ implies a preference for A over B.7



















ρ(α−1) when α < ρ < 1, the four




1,NEG. Moreover, the change of c
?
1
to the change of r is more sensitive in treatments SUR/POS since we have
(1 + r)
1
ρ−1 < (1 + r)
1
α−1 . This would lead to the “cross-over” effect of the
optimal solutions, by which we mean that we may have c?1,SUR/POS > c
?
1,NEG
when the r is low and the reverse when the r is high.
Chew and Epstein (1990) consider general non-EU preference over risk.
Subsequently, Halevy (2008) employs a specific form of non-EU (dual theory
in Yarri (1987)) to explain dynamic inconsistency. The representation is as
follows: ∫
(u (c1) + δu (c2)) df (1−M) ,
where M is the cdf of µ and f is a probability weighting function. The
follwing are the evaluations of our treatments:
USUR = u (c1) + δu (c2)
7By triangular inequality, it is easy to check that (xρ + δyρ)α/ρ < xα + δα/ρyα when
α < ρ.
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UPOS = f (0.5) (u (c1) + δu (c2))
UNEG =
{
f (0.5)u (c1) + (1− f (0.5)) δu (c2) if u (c1) ≥ δu (c2)
(1− f (0.5))u (c1) + f (0.5) δu (c2) if u (c1) < δu (c2)
UUNC =
{
f (0.5)u (c1) + (f (0.75) + f (0.25)− f (0.5)) δu (c2) if u (c1) ≥ δu (c2)
(f (0.75) .+ f (0.25)− f (0.5))u (c1) + f (0.5) δu (c2) if u (c1) < δu (c2)
It is immediate that the optimal solutions in treatments SUR and POS
conincide. Suppose we have f (0.5) < f (0.75) + f (0.25) − f (0.5) < 1 −
f (0.5) , then the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between c1 and c2 sat-
isfies MRSSUR/POS > MRSUNC > MRSNEG when u (c1) > δu (c2) , and
we have the reverse for these MRS when u (c1) < δu (c2) . This would imply
that the change of c?1 to the change of r in treatments NEG/UNC is smoother
compared to that in treatments SUR/POS, which would again generate the
”cross-over” effect.8 Moreover, certain restriction on the probability weight-
ing function can deliver f (0.5) < f (0.75) + f (0.25)− f (0.5) ≈ 1− f (0.5) ,
which will make c?1,UNC and c
?
1,NEG close to each other.
9
Some other models could also be considered here (see Fredericgke, Loewen-
stein, O’Donoghue, 2002 for review). For example, habit formation models
assume a history-dependent utility function in time where the cross deriva-
tive with respect to current consumption and past consumption is positive.
However, such a utility function will predict preference for scenario B over A
in our motivating example (with EU in risk), which is inconsistent with our
intuition. Indeed, some other models, like reference point utility and antic-
ipation utility, follow the history dependence mechanism, which is against
intuition in explaining our treatments.
3.4 Results
In this section, we first summarize the behavior for four treatments in both
aggregate level and individual level and then report structural estimation
results of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy (2008).
8Note that there would exist a range of r such that the optimal solutions c?1 in treat-
ments NEG and UNC lie on the kinc, which means u (c?1) = δu (100− (1 + r) c?1) .
9In appendix A, we provide numerical examples to show the cross-over effect for the
estimated parameter values ρ = 0.97, δ = 0.97 and α = 0.58 in Epstein and Zin (1989),
δ = 0.97, u (x) = x0.95, f (0.5) = 0.42 and f (0.25) + f (0.75) = 1 in Halevy (2008).
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3.4.1 Summarized behavior
Figure 1 shows the mean and standard errors of allocations to earlier pay-
ment of aggregate behavior for the four treatments under several different
gross interest rates and 2 time menus. Three patterns are revealed: 1. The
decisions are similar for SUR and POS treatments. 2. The decisions are
similar for NEG and UNC treatments. 3. There is a cross-over between
SUR/POS and NEG/UNC treatments.
Note that the cross-over behavior between SUR and UNC replicates the
findings in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b). We further conduct pairwise
comparison of allocations in the four treatments for each gross interest rate
and each time menu using Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of equality (Table
S1). Although for some gross interest rate the allocation under SUR treat-
ment is significantly higher than that under POS treatment, the difference is
generally small in comparison with the difference between SUR/POS treat-
ments and NEG/UNC treatments.
Figure 3.1: Allocation to sooner payment across treatments.
The data suggests a large proportion of decisions are in the corners, which
means the decision maker allocates either 0 or 100 to earlier payment. The
proportion of corner decisions ranges from 75% to 90% for SUR and POS
treatments, and from 10% to 20% for NEG and UNC treatments. (Table
S2). This further supports the observed patterns.
We further test the effect of interest rate, time, and different treatments.
Due to the cernsored data in the corners, we use tobit regression for the anal-
ysis. We regress allocation on treatment (binary variable), interest rate (7
ordered category variable), time menu (binary variable), and the interaction
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terms of these three variables. Standard errors are clustered in individual
levels. The results are reported in Table 1. F-test is used to examine the
null hypothesis that the treatment related terms have zero slopes. No sig-
nificant difference is found between treatments NEG and POS (p ¿ 0.655),
while significant difference is found between treatments SUR versus POS (p
¡ 0.01). In sharp contrast, the difference between treatments SUR/POS and
NEG/UNC is highly significant (p ¡ 0.001).
Table 3.1: Tobit Regression Results.10
A similar F-test is used to test whether the allocation decisions in the two
time menu are distinct. Should a decision maker be a hyperbolic discounter,
he/she would allocate less to the earlier payment in the 16 weeks versus
20 weeks treatment compared to that in the 1 week versus 5 weeks treat-
ment. No significant difference is found for both SUR/POS (p ¿ 0.162) and
UNC/NEG (p ¿ 0.923) treatments. This replicates the findings in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a; 2012b).
10The table reports regression coefficients with clustered standard errors. In the last
three rows, we test the effects of risk, time and interest rate using F-test, and the p-values
are reported in respective row.
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We also study the behaviors in individual level. We first compare the
SUR and POS treatments by counting the number of occasions that sub-
jects make different allocations. There are 7 gross interest rate and 2 time
menus, giving rise to 14 possible occasions. As shown in Figure 2A, 50% of
the subjects have the same allocation for all 14 occasions, and 2% of the sub-
jects have different allocation for all 14 occasions. We further compute the
absolute difference in tokens allocated to the sooner payment between SUR
and POS. As shown in Figure 2B, 58% of the subjects have the difference
less than 5 tokens, and 3% of the subjects have the difference more than
50 tokens. In the same manner, NEG and UNC treatments are compared.
35% of the subjects have same allocations for all 14 occasions, and 5% of
the subjects have different allocations for all 14 occasions. Moreover, 52%
of the subjects have the difference less than 5 tokens, and 3% of the subjects
have the difference more than 50 tokens.
Similarly, we make four more comparisons, namely, SUR versus NEG,
SUR versus UNC, POS versus NEG, and POS versus UNC. Averaging across
four comparisons to simple presentation, 7% of the subjects have same allo-
cations for all 14 occasions, and 55% of the subjects have different allocations
for all 14 occasions. Moreover, 13% of the subjects have a difference less
than 5 tokens, and 40% of the subjects have a difference more than 50 to-
kens. This is in sharp contrast with the comparisons SUR versus POS, as
well as NGE versus UNC, which also reveales that the observed patterns
persist in the individual level.
Figure 3.2: Number of different allocation across treatments in individual
level.
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Figure 3.3: Difference in allocation cross treatments in individual level.
3.4.2 Estimation results
In this subsection, we estimate the preference parameters in Epstein and
Zin (1989) and Halevy (2008). We posit a hyperbolic function with back-
ground consumptions following the methodology developed in Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012 a; 2012b) .11 For example,
USUR = ((c1 + w)
ρ + βsδ (c2 + w)
ρ)1/ρ ,
where δ is the discount factor for 4 weeks, and s = 1 for one week versus
five weeks time menu and s = 0 for 16 weeks versus 20 weeks time menu to
capture the discount factor difference between the two time menu. If β is
significantly smaller than 1, it suggests that the discount factor is smaller
for first time menu than the second time menu, and it is in support of
hyperbolic discounting preference. w can be interpreted as the classic Stone-
Geary consumption minima, intertemporal reference points, or background
consumption. Similar specification is used in other three treatments as well
as in Halevy (2008).




, where xji is the allocation to the early payment given the interest






= 0, where P represents the parameters to be estimated.






11Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) detail the discussions of the censored data issue and
show that accounting for censoring issues has little influence on the estimates. In a recent
comment on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a, b), Harrison et al. (2013) discuss thoroughly
about potential problems with corner solutions. We recognize that the censored data and
corner decisions might be a problem as our data, and therefore we constrain our estimation







∣∣∣f (xji , rj , P)∣∣∣2. One possible interpretation here
is that there are errors when subjects solve the optimal allocations, and the
errors centre around zero. The estimation is conducted using Stata 11 with
standard errors clustered on the individual level. Detals about estimation
are presented in Appendix C.
Table 1 presents the results of estimated parameters. For Epstein and
Zin (1989), the estimated risk aversion coefficient is 0.587, which is signifi-
cantly smaller than 1 (p ¡ 0.001). This suggests a concave utility function for
risk preference, and is in line with many experiments eliciting risk preference
(see Harrison and Rutstrom 2008 for a review). The estimated intertemporal
substitution coefficient is 0.972, significantly smaller than 1 (p ¡ 0.001), and
similar as 0.920, the curvature estimated from treatment SUR in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a). This indicates very small and yet positive intertem-
poral substitution. Note that should the two parameters be equal, Epstein
and Zin (1989) would reduce to DEU. Hence our result rejects DEU. More-
over, the intertemporal substitution parameter is significantly bigger than
risk aversion coefficient (p ¡ 0.001). This suggests a preference for A over B
in the example in the introduction.
For Halevy (2008), the non-parametric estimate of probability weight for
f(0.5) is 0.42, which is significantly smaller than 0.5 (p ¡ 0.001). The non-
parametric estimate of probability weight for f(0.25)+f(0.75) is 0.99, which
is significantly greater than 2f(0.5) (p ¡ 0.001). This supports the theoritical
prediction that there is cross-over effect when f(0.5) < f(0.25) + f(0.75) <
1 − f(0.5). Notice that if f(p) = p, Halevy would be reduce to DEU, and
hence our result here also rejects DEU.The curvature of utility function is
0.963, which is significantly smaller than 1 (p ¡ 0.001) and not signficantly
different from the one estimated using Epstein and Zin (p ¿ 0.904). Overall,
the estimation results of both Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy (2008)
show the distinction between risk preference and time preference, and sup-
port the separation between risk attitude and intertemporal substitution.
In Epstein and Zin (1989), the 4 weeks discount factor δ is estimated to
be 0.972, which is significantly different from 1 (p ¡ 0.001). The calculated
annualized discount factor is 0.724. The estimated discount factor difference
between the two time menu β is 0.004, not significantly different from 0 (p
¿ 0.224), which is in agreement with the findings in Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a). The estimates of δ and β in Halvey (2008) are not signficantly
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Table 3.2: Estimated parameters in aggregate level.
different from those in Epstein and Zin (1989) (δ : p > 0.852; β : p > 0.829).
3.5 Related Literature
Recently, there is a puzzle on distinct utilities for risk and for time in the
experimental literature (e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a, b; Coble and
Lusk, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2012). Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) adopt
the CTB design, using SUR treatment as in our experiment, together with
the standard multiple price list design to elicit risk attitude (Coller and
Williams, 1999; Holt and Laury, 2002). They find that the estimated curva-
ture from CTB is independent of and smaller than that from multiple price
list design. They further interpret the findings as distinct utilities between
certainty and uncertainty, as in Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky
(1979).
In a follow-up study, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) bring risk into
intertemporal choice and test DEU.12 In their design, they compare the
allocation decision when there is a p chance of receiving the earlier payment
and a q chance of receiving later payment (denoted as (p, q) treatment) with
the allocation decision in (0.5p, 0.5q) . They have three pairs of treatments:
12In an earlier study by Keren and Roelofsam (1995), they observe that when uncer-
tainty is introduced to the intertemporal decision making setting, e.g., 90% chance of
getting $100 now versus 90% chance of getting $120 one week later, the present bias dis-
appears. Halevy (2008) incorporates this intuition into the prospect theory, and provides
a theoretical foundation linking the present bias with the certainty effect.
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(1, 1) & (0.5, 0.5), (1, 0.8) & (0.5, 0.4), and (0.8, 1) & (0.4, 0.5). The
key difference from ours is that risks between the two periods are always
independent in their setting.13 DEU predicts that the optimal allocations
are the same for (p, q) and (0.5p, 0.5q) , which they coin as common ratio
effect in time. However, they observe a cross-over for (1, 1) & (0.5, 0.5)
treatments similar as ours, and identify a preference to allocate more to the
certain payments in treatments (0.8, 1) or (1, 0.8), relative to their common
ratio counterparts. They interpret these results as suggesting a difference
between risk preference and time preference, and also attribute their results
to the certainty effect.
Subsequently, Abdellaoui et al. (2012) measure subjects’ certainty equiv-
alent CEr for gamble (p, x; (1− p) , y) , as well as present equivalent CEt for
consumption paths (xt, yt+k) with a range of x and y. They find that the es-
timated utility under risk is more curved than utility over time, similar as in
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a). They interpret the results as utility under
risk and utility over time being context-specific and further caution against
transferring utility across contexts. In Coble and Lusk (2010), subjects make
a series of binary choices, between certain outcomes in two different time
periods, between risk outcomes in the same period, as well as between risky
outcomes in different time periods. They estimate the intertemporl substi-
tution and risk aversion using Epstein and Zin (1989) specification, and find
distinct parameters for intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. In An-
dersen et al (2011), subjects respond to three experimental tasks including
time discounting, atemporal risk attitude, and choice between positive and
negative correlated intertemporal risks. They further apply the framework
of Epstein and Tanny (1980) on correlation aversion to show the separa-
tion between preference for risk and time. The key difference between ours
and Coble and Lusk (2010) as well as Anderson et al (2011) is that our
design allows a direct separation between risk attitude and intertemporal
substitution.
We posit that all these experimental evidence suggesting distinct prefer-
ences for risk and time could be reconciled under Epstein and Zin (1989) or
Halevy (2008). It is straightforward that both theories can accommondate
the disctinction identified separately in static and dynamic environments
(e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a). In fact, both theories could be com-
13Note that (1, 1) & (0.5, 0.5) treatment is the same as our treatments SUR and UNC.
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patible with some more complex observations in the enviroment where risk
preference and time preference are interplayed. For example, Moreover, it
can be shown that the observations in treatments (1, 0.8) & (0.5, 0.4), and
(0.8, 1) & (0.4, 0.5) may result from separation between risk preference and
time preference. With Epstein and Zin (1989), we have the following utilities
for treatments (1, 0.8) & (0.5, 0.4)
(In particular, it could offer an alternative explanation to the observed
patterns in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b). Recall that in our POS treat-
ment, though there is still uncertainty involved, the behavior is similar as





















Intuitively, incentive for consumption smoothing in treatment (1, 0.8)
mostly comes from substitution parameter ρ while in treatment (0.5, 0.4) it
mostly comes from risk attitude parameter α, hence making it possible to
generate preference for certainty as in their data. While for Halevy (2008),
the utilities for both treatments are as follows
U(1,0.8) = u (c1) + f (0.8) δu (c2) ,
U(0.5,0.4) =
{
f (0.5)u (c1) + (f (0.7) + f (0.2)− f (0.5)) δu (c2) if u (c1) ≥ δu (c2)
(f (0.7) + f (0.2)− f (0.5))u (c1) + f (0.5) δu (c2) if u (c1) < δu (c2)
.
With properly chosen f (p) , it is possible to always have MRS(1.0.8) >
MRS(0.5.0.4), which could be compatible with the observed certainty effect.
14
The last thing we want to point out is that if one ignores the separation,
it might lead to distortion in estimations for the discount factor. For ex-
ample, Takeuchi (2011) experimentally elicits time discount factor through
an equivalent risk treatment. He first identifies the probability p such that
(p, x) is indifferent to (1, y) , and then elicits the equivalent delay t such
that the subject is indifferent between getting x at period t and getting y
at period 0. Thus the discount factor for period t would be equal to p as-
suming DEU. However, if we consider different utility functions for risk and
time, for instance, under Epstein and Zin (1989), the actual equivalence is
(pxα)1/α = (δtx
ρ)1/ρ = y, which implies the elicited discount factor satisfies
δ
α/ρ
t = p, which is different from δt if we do not have α = ρ. In particular, if
14We offer numerical examples for preference for certainty with the same set of param-
eters in appendix A.
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we have α < ρ, it will lead to over-estimated discount factor. Similary, the
equivalence becomes f (p)u (x) = δtu (x) = u (y) in Halevy (2008), which
will again lead to over-estimated discount factor given convex f .
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we experimentally test the distinction between risk prefer-
ence and time preference. In the experimental setting, subjects are asked
to allocate payments in two periods with different correlated risks. Subjects
behave in a similar manner for sure and perfectly positively correlated risks,
as well as for perfectly negatively correlated or uncorrelated risks. Subjects
tend to allocate different amounts of money to sooner payment when fac-
ing different treatments, which rejects DEU and support models including
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Halevy (2008).
Further studies that can differentiate these theories could be of great
interest. For example, as Epstein and Zin (1989) assume EU in risk, one
can test an analygous common ratio effect as in the static environment. On
the other hand, Halevy (2008) employs non-EU in risk with the same utility
index as that in time, which could be tested by eliciting risk preference and
time preference separately.
Finally, we would like to note that the experiment in this study is based
on monetary reward and it may be subject to the concern that decision
maker do not have enough incentives for smoothing monetary payoffs over
time. Indeed, the data we observe in treatments SUR and POS tends to sug-
gest that decision maker has few smoothing incentives over money between
different periods without risk. Consumption goods could used to induce
more intertemporal smoothing than the observation in our current study.15
Notwithstanding, we believe that this would not change the different sources
of desire for consumption smoothing in our treatments.
15In most of the experiments about intertemporal choice, monetary reward is used to
elicit time preference. Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) argue that if the discount
rates inferred from monetary rewards and consumption goods are significantly correlated,
the measurement through monetary reward might be ecologically valid. In their experi-
ment, they elicit discounting rate for both monetary rewards and primary reward (choco-
late), and find a positive and statistically significant relation between short-term discount




Numerical example 1: The “crossing over” effect under Epstein and Zin
(1989) for the parameters ρ = 0.97, δ = 0.97, and α = 0.58. (X-axis denotes
gross interest rate 1 + r)










Figure 3.4: Blue: Allocation to Early Consumption for SURE/POSITIVE
Green: Optimal Allocation to Early Consumption for NEGATIVE
Red: Optimal Allocation to Early Consumption for UNCORRELATED
Numerical example 2: For treatments (1, 0.8) and (0.5, 0.4) with the same
parameters under Epstein and Zin (1989).








Figure 3.5: Blue: Allocation to Early Consumption for (1, 0.8)
Green: Optimal Allocation to Early Consumption for (0.5, 0.4)
Numerical example 3: The “crossing over” effect under Halevy (2008) for the
parameters ρ = 0.97, δ = 0.97, f(0.5) = 0.42, and f(0.25) + f(0.75) = 0.99.
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Figure 3.6: Blue: Allocation to Early Consumption for SURE/POSITIVE
Green: Optimal Allocation to Early Consumption for NEGATIVE
Red: Optimal Allocation to Early Consumption for UNCORRELATED
Numerical example 4: For treatments (1, 0.8) and (0.5, 0.4) with the same
parameters under Halevy (2008).












Figure 3.7: Blue: Allocation to Early Consumption for (1, 0.8)
Green: Optimal Allocation to Early Consumption for (0.5, 0.4)
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3.7.2 Supplementary Tables
Table 3.3: Mean allocation to early consumption and tests of equality.
Table 3.4: Percentage of corner decisions and tests of equality.
3.7.3 Estimating Aggregate Preferences
In this appendix, we discribe details of our estimation. We follow the
methodology developed in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012 a; 2012b) using
a hyperbolic function with background consumptions.16 For example, the
utility in SUR using Epstein and Zin (1989) would be
16Since we identify hyperbolic discounting in the previous analysis, we incorporate this
in subsequent estimation.
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USUR = ((c1 − w)ρ + βsδ (c2 − w)ρ)1/ρ ,
where δ is the discount factor for 4 weeks, and s = 1 for one week ver-
sus five weeks time menu and s = 0 for 16 weeks versus 20 weeks time
menu to capture the discount factor difference between the two time menu.
If β is significantly smaller than 1, it suggests that the discount factor is
smaller for first time menu than the second time menu, and it is in support
of hyperbolic discounting preference. w can be interpreted as the classic
Stone-Geary consumption minima, intertemporal reference points, or back-
ground consumption, which is also included in the estimation in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a; 2012b). Similar specification is used in other three
treatments.




, where xji is the allocation to the early payment given the interest




j , α, ρ, β, δ, w
)
= 0. Overall, we have
f =
 100 (βsδ (1 + rj)) 1ρ−1
(βsδ)
1






)× ISUR + 100 (βsδ (1 + rj)) 1ρ−1
(βsδ)
1






)× IPOS +100 (βsδ) αρ(α−1) (1 + rj) 1α−1
(βsδ)
α













100− (1 + rj)xji − w)ρ)α/ρ−1×[(
xji − w
)ρ−1 − βsδ (1 + rj) (100− (1 + rj)xji − w)ρ−1]+[(
xji − w
)α−1 − βsδα/ρ (1 + rj) (100− (1 + rj)xji − w)α−1]
× IUNC
where I is an indicator function for the treatments. Our purpose here is to
conduct a group estimation for α, ρ, β, δ, w.












∣∣∣f (xji , rj , α, ρ, β, δ, w)∣∣∣2.
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One possible interpretation is that there are errors when subjects make
the FOC calculations, and the errors centre around zero.
For Halevy (2008), we use similar method. First, let l = f (0.5) , and
































































when u (c1) < δu (c2) .
As c′1,N might not satisfy u (c1) ≥ δu (c2) , and c
′′
1,N might not satisfy
u (c1) < δu (c2) . If only one satisfies, the one would be the optimal solution;
if both satisfy, the one deliver higher utility would be the optimal solution;
if both do not satisfy, the optimal solution would be in the coner u (c1) =
δu (c2) . For estimation, we specify the following optimal solutions. Let c
?
1
be such that u (c?1) = δu (c
?
2) , where c
?





















































































We then specify a power function u(c) = cρ to be comparable with
the estimation of Epstein and Zin (1989). As there are only f(0.5) and
f(0.25) + f(0.75) to estimation, we estimate them, l and n, directly instead
of specifying a function for f(p). The paramters β, δ, w are specified the
same as the estimation of Epstein and Zin.






, where xji is the allocation to the early payment given
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j , l, n, ρ, β, δ, w
)
= 0. Subsequently, we conduct the estimation using





∣∣∣f (xji , rj , l, n, ρ, β, δ, w)∣∣∣2.
The interpretation is similar that there are errors when subjects solve
the optimal solutions, and the errors centre around zero. We use stata 11
to conduct the estimation.
3.7.4 Experimental Instructions
Welcome to our study on decision making. The instructions are simple and
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a con-
siderable amount of money which will be paid to you in cheques before you
leave today. Different subjects may earn different amounts of money. What
you earn today depends partly on your decisions, and partly on chance. All
information provided will be kept confidential. Information in the study will
be used for research purposes only. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand to ask our experimenters at any time. Cell phones and other elec-
tronic devices are not allowed, and please do not communicate with others
during the experiment.
• Earn Money:
To begin, you will be given $12 as show up fee. You will receive this
payment in two payments of $6 each. The two $6 minimum payments will
come to you at two different times. These times will be determined in the
way described below. Whatever you earn from the study today will be added
to these minimum payments.
In this study, you will make 56 choices over how to allocate money be-
tween two points in time, one time is sooner and one is later. Both the
sooner and later times will vary across decisions. This means you could be
receiving payments as soon as one week from today, and as late as 20 weeks
from today.
It is important to note that the payments in this study involve chance.
There could be a chance that your sooner payment, your later payment or
both will not be sent at all. For each decision, you will be fully informed
of the chance involved for the sooner and later payments. Whether or not
your payments will be sent will be determined at the END of the experiment
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today. If, by chance, one of your payments is not sent, you will receive only
the $6 minimum payment.
Once all 56 decisions have been made, we will randomly select one of the
56 decisions as the decision-that-counts. This will be done in three stages.
First, we will pick a number from 1 to 56 at random to determine which one
is the decision-that-counts and the corresponding sooner and later payment
dates. We will then determine whether the payments will be sent based
on chances, which we will describe in details later. Last, we will use the
resolved chances to determine your actual earnings.
Note, since all decisions are equally likely to be chosen, you should make
each decision as if it will be the decision-that-counts. When calculating your
earnings from the decision-that-counts, we will add to your earnings the two
$6 minimum payments. Thus, you will always get paid at least $6 at the
chosen earlier time, and at least $6 at the chosen later time.
IMPORTANT: We will sign you cheques with the specified date at the
end of today’s experiment. Under Singapore banking practices, a cheque
can be cashed only on or within 6 months of the date of the cheque. It
is very IMPORTANT that you do not try to cash before the date of the
cheque, since you will not be able to get the money, and it will also incur a
$40 lose for the experimenter.
• How it Works:
In each decision you are asked to divide 100 tokens between two payments
at two different dates: Payment A (which is sooner) and Payment B (which
is later). Tokens will be exchanged for money. The tokens you allocate to
Payment B (later) will always be worth at least as much as the tokens you
allocate to Payment A (sooner). The process is best described by example.
In the table below, in row 3, each token you allocate to one week later
is worth $0.18, while each token you allocate to five weeks later is worth
$0.20. So, if you allocate all 100 tokens to one week later, you may earn
100x$0.18 = $18 (+ $6 minimum payment) on this date and nothing on five
weeks later (+ $6 minimum payment). If you allocate all 100 tokens to five
weeks later, you may earn 100x$0.20 = $20 (+ $6 minimum payment) on
this date and nothing on five week later (+ $6 minimum payment). You may
also choose to allocate some tokens to the earlier date and some to the later
date. For instance, if you allocate 60 tokens to one week later and 40 tokens
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to five weeks later, then one week later you may earn 60x$0.18 = $10.04 (+
$6 minimum payment) and five weeks later you would earn 40x$0.20 = $8
(+ $6 minimum payment). The Payoff Table shows some of the token-dollar
exchanges at all relevant token exchange rates, which applies to all decisions
in this experiment.
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• Sample Decision Making Sheet
Table 3.5: Sample Decision Making Sheet
• Chance of Receiving Payments:
Each decision sheet lists the chances that each payment will be sent.
Each decision in that sheet share the same chances that the payments will
be sent. There are four cases.
Case A
If this decision were chosen as the decision-that-counts, both PAYMENT
A and PAYMENT B will be sent for sure.
Case B
There are some chance that PAYMENT A and PAYMENT B will not
be sent. If this decision were chosen as the decision-that-counts, we would
determine the actual payments by throwing TWO ten-sided dices. There
is 50% chance that PAYMENT A will be sent by throwing the first dice;
there is 50% chance that PAYMENT B will be sent by throwing the second
dice. Specifically, if the first dice tossed is odd, PAYMENT A will be sent;
otherwise PAYMENT A will not be sent. If the second dice tossed is odd,
PAYMENT B will be sent; otherwise PAYMENT B will not be sent.
Case C
There are some chance that PAYMENT A and PAYMENT B will not
be sent. If this decision were chosen as the decision-that-counts, we would
determine the actual payments by throwing ONE ten-sided dice. There is a
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50% chance that both PAYMENT A and PAYMENT B will be sent, deter-
mined by the dice. Specifically, if the dice tossed is odd, both PAYMENT
A and PAYMENT B will be sent; and there will be no payments if the dice
tossed is even.
Case D
There are some chance that either PAYMENT A or PAYMENT B will
not be sent. If this decision were chosen as the decision-that-counts, we
would determine the actual payments by throwing ONE ten-sided dice.
There is a 50% chance that either PAYMENT A or PAYMENT B will
actually be sent, determined by the dice. Specifically, if the dice tossed is
odd, PAYMENT A will be sent while PAYMENT B will not be sent; and
PAYMENT B will be sent if the dice tossed is even while PAYMENT A will
not be sent.
• Things to Remember:
– You will always be allocating exactly 100 tokens.
– Tokens you allocate to Payment A (sooner) and Payment B (later)
will be exchanged for money at different rates. The tokens you
allocate to Payment B will always be worth at least as much as
those you allocate to Payment A.
– Payment A and Payment B will have different types of chance.
You will be fully informed of the chances.
– On each decision sheet you will be asked 7 questions. For each
decision you will allocate 100 tokens. Allocate exactly 100 tokens
for each decision row, no more, no less.
– At the end of the study a random number will be drawn to de-
termine which is the decision-that-counts. Because each question
is equally likely, you should treat each decision as if it were the
one that determines your payments. The payments you chose
will actually be sent or not will be determined by chance, which
is put down on the decision-that-counts.






One common assumption in modeling time preferences is additivity, which
states that the valuation of a stream of consumptions equals the sum-
mation of the valuations (discounted) of the consumption in each period.
In a dynamic environment involving risks, additivity together with sepa-
rability are the key assumptions to deliver separable additive discounted
expected utility (DEU henceforth) for a contingent consumption stream:∑
t βtE0 (Ut (c˜t)) , where c˜t denotes the random consumption in period t,
Ut is a time-dependent vNM utility function and βt is the discount fac-
tor. Many commonly used intertemporal utility functions fall into this cat-
egory, including the conventional recursive expected utility (REU hence-
forth): V (zt) = Et (u (ct) + βV (zt+1)) , which imposes additional consis-
tency assumptions.
Here, we challenge separable additivity with the following behavioral
intuition. Consider two contingent consumption plans depending on two
equally likely states s1 and s2 (resolved at time 0) as follows:
Option A: getting x at time t if the state is s1; and getting x at time
t+ 1 if the state is s2; otherwise getting nothing.
Option B: getting x at time t and x at time t + 1 if the state is s1;
otherwise getting nothing.
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Intuitively, a risk averse decision maker would prefer option A to B as
the risks are diversified across time in option A, while not so in B. However,
DEU/REU predict an equivalence between the two options. The fundamen-
tal reason is that a decision maker with separable additive preference only
cares about the marginal distributions conditioning on each period when
evaluating intertemporal risks. As the marginal risks in each period are
the same half-half chance of getting x in both option A and B, separable
additive utility functions, including DEU and REU, are always indifferent
between option A and B and fail to generate preference for diversification
across time.
In this study, we axiomatize a behavioral model to accommodate pref-
erence for diversification across time. We start by observing the marginal
distributions of risks, although identical in each period for option A and B,
have different correlation structures. In particular, the intertemporal risks in
each period are negatively correlated in option A, while positively correlated
in option B. We then characterize the behavioral foundations of preference
for diversification across time through formulating preference for negative
intertemporal correlation. Our model is essentially a mean-variance model
in a simple dynamic environment, where all the risks are resolved at period
0.1 Our representation permits the following form:
V (w) =
∑T





where w˜ is a stochastic consumption plan over a finite period T, and w˜t
denotes the marginal distribution of w˜ in period t, which represents the
contingent consumption in t. Intuitively, this representation accommodates
preference for negative intertemporal correlation through the second vari-
ance term, yet it also permits a mean-variance utility for each period t inside
the square bracket.
Some works generalizing REU, including Kreps and Porteus (1978),
Chew and Epstein (1989, 1990) and Epstein and Zin (1989), can also gener-
ate a difference between option A and B by creating a discrepancy between
risk attitude and intertemporal substitution. Kreps and Porteus (1978) relax
timing indifference by permitting different vNM utility functions in different
periods, and relative curvature of utility functions generates preference for
different timing of uncertainty resolution. Subsequently, Chew and Epstein
1We later point out that this restriction is not necessary.
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(1989) extend Kreps and Porteus (1978) to allow for non-expected utilities.
Epstein and Zin (1989) propose a recursive representation of Kreps and Por-
teus (1978) that explicitly identifies the difference between risk attitude and
intertemporal substitution. Their representation allows vNM utility func-
tions with distinct curvatures separately accounting for risk attitude and
intertemporal substitution. Chew and Epstein (1990) pursue the alterna-
tive option by weakening consistency. They propose a representation that
permits essentially non-expected utility in risk and additive utility in time,
which is recently used in Halevy (2008) to explain hyperbolic discounting.
As discussed later, this current study deviates from the existing literature
as our model explores solely the diversification effect without confounding
it with preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution, and we are also
free from a potential problem in Chew and Epstein (1990) that may arise in
the limit. Our model is also related to some decision theory studies in other
areas. In particular, Chew and Sagi (2011) apply quadratic utility (Chew,
Epstein and Segal, 1991) to evaluate preference for stochastic allocations of
wealth in a society, and obtain a generalized Gini index that can exhibit
the preference for shared destiny, which is modeled as positive correlation
between the allocations in different cohorts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We propose our model
in section 2. Section 3 discusses the implications of related literature and
concludes the paper. All proofs are appended.
4.2 Model
Let C be a compact and convex subspace of R+ with a range of m, and T
is a positive integer which represents finite time periods. The set of states
is a continuous probability space (Θ,Σ, µ) , where µ is convex-valued on a
sigma algebra of events Σ. A stochastic consumption plan w˜ is a mapping
from Θ×T to C. The domain of a preference relationship  is the set of all
stochastic consumption plans W.
For every w˜ ∈ W, let w˜θ be w˜ restricted to state θ, which is the vector
of consumptions (T dimension) in state θ, and let w˜t be w˜ restricted to
period t, which is the random consumption in period t. wt denotes the mean
of w˜t. If w˜t and w˜
′
t have the same distribution and w˜t 6= w˜′t, we call w˜′t a
permutation of w˜t.
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In the following, we give our characterization of a dynamic mean-variance
utility function. We use w˜, w˜′ to denote the elements of W, and αw˜ +
(1− α) w˜′ refers to the usual pointwise mixture. We first impose the follow-
ing basic conditions.
B1 (Ordering)  is complete, transitive, continuous, and w˜  w˜′ whenever
w˜ > w˜′.
B2 (State Independence) Suppose w˜ = (w˜t)t and w˜
′ = (w˜′t)t have the same
joint distribution, then w ∼ w′.
B3 (Discounting) Given w˜, and let w˜′ be obtained by transferring a positive
amount from w˜t to w˜t+1 in every state θ, then w  w′.
In these assumptions, B1 is traditional, B3 is related to discounting
while B2 is a distributional property regarding the anonymity property of
the states. By B2, swapping two vectors w˜θ and w˜θ′ will not change the
valuation of w˜ as long as θ and θ′ have the same probability measure. Besides
the above basic assumptions, we additionally impose the following behavior
axioms.
Axiom 1 (Mixture Symmetry): For every w˜ and w˜′ and any α ∈ (0, 1/2),
w˜ ∼ w˜′ ⇒ αw˜ + (1− α)w˜′ ∼ αw˜′ + (1− α)w˜.
Axiom 2 (Quasiconcavity): For every w˜ and w˜′, w˜ ∼ w˜′ ⇒ αw˜+(1−α)w˜′ 
w˜ for α ∈ (0, 1).
Axiom 3 (Ex-ante Risk Aversion): Given w˜ such that w˜t = w˜t′ , and replace
w˜t′ with one of its permutations w˜
′
t′ to get w˜
′, we have w˜′  w˜.
Axiom 4 (Certainty Independence): For deterministic consumption plans
w˜ and w˜′, w˜ ∼ w˜′ ⇒ αw˜ + (1− α)w˜′ ∼ w˜ for α ∈ (0, 1).
Axiom 5 (Weak Time Independence): Let w˜ be a consumption plan such
that w˜t is a permutation of w˜t′ , and let w˜
′ be obtained by swapping w˜t and
w˜t′ , we have w˜ ∼ w˜′.
Axiom 5* (Strong Time Independence): Let w˜ be a consumption plan
such that wt = wt′ , and let w˜
′ be obtained by swapping w˜t and w˜t′ , we have
w˜ ∼ w˜′.
Among these axioms, Mixture Symmetry is the key axiom in Chew,
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Epstein and Segal (1991), where they develop the quadratic utility. Mix-
ture Symmetry and Quasiconcavity together characterize concave indiffer-
ence curves in the domain, which in turn deliver mean-variance like utility
functions. Certainty Independence permits restricted independence in the
dimension of time since the dimension of states vanishes when the consump-
tion plans are constant. The intuition for Ex-ante Risk Aversion comes from
our motivating example. Weak Time Independence axiom states that if the
random consumptions in different periods have the same distribution over
Θ, then the decision maker would be indifferent if the consumptions in two
periods are swapped. Specifically, consider the following consumption plan,































Given the above assumptions, we have the following results.
Proposition 4.1 A preference relationship  satisfies B1-B3, Axiom 1-5 iff
it can be represented by the following: V (w) =
∑T
t=1 [γtE (w˜t)− φtvar (w˜t)]−
ϕ
∑









and φt + Tϕ ≤ γtm .
Intuitively, we have a mean-variance utility γtE (w˜t)− φtvar (
∑
w˜t) for
random consumption w˜t in each period, and the covariance term captures
aversion to positive intertemporal correlation. The last restriction on φt and
ϕ is due to the monotonicity condition in B1. If we adopt a stronger time
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independence axiom, it will imply that all the φt are the same and we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 A preference relationship  satisfies B1-B3, Axiom 1-4 and
5* iff it can be represented by the following: V (w) =
∑T












The intuition for Epstein and Zin (1989) accounting for the difference be-
tween option A and B is as follows: When evaluating intertemporal risks,
a decision maker aggregates consumptions in each state with intertemporal
substitution effect, and then evaluates the aggregated valuations according
to certain risk attitude. In REU, one utility function u captures both risk
attitude and substitution effect and fails to account for the difference be-
tween option A and B, while Epstein and Zin (1989) permits different vNM
utility functions for different effects as follows
Ut =
{





where ρ captures the intertemporal substitution effect between current con-





and α captures the risk attitude when evaluating contingent future utilities




. Relative curvatures of these two effects
leads to a difference between option A and B. Specifically, relative more con-
cavity in “risk attitude” compared to “intertemporal substitution” (α ≤ ρ)
implies that a decision maker is more willing to diversify the consumptions
between different states than between different periods, and thus in turn
generates a preference of option A over B.
Notably, when α ≤ ρ, the representation in Epstein and Zin (1989) would
also lead to a preference for early uncertainty resolution, by which we mean
pδ(c1,c2) + (1− p) δ(c1,c′2) 
(
c1, pδc2 + (1− p) δc′2
)
.
The dynamic mean-variance model proposed in the current study is free
from this correlation of behaviors as all the uncertainties are resolved at
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time 0 in our setting. In fact, one may consider a dynamic setting where
the risks are gradually resolved and the information structure is represented
by some filtration {Ft}Tt=1 , our domain is more general since the set of
{Ft}Tt=1-adapted consumption plans is a subset of W. Given this restricted
domain, the timing of uncertainty resolution only makes difference in the
information structure {Ft}Tt=1 but not the consumption plan itself. Thus,
our model can account for the concurrence of time neutrality and preference
for diversification, which could be tested by experimental instruments in the
future.
Chew and Epstein (1990) consider instead non-expected utility for risk2
and permit the following representation∫
V (w˜θ) df (1− µ (V ))
where V is a utility function defined on deterministic consumption plans,
µ is the induced distribution on Θ, and f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is an increasing
probability weighting function. The valuations of option A and B under this
specification are f (0.5)u (x) + (1− f (0.5)) δu (x) and f (0.5) (u (x) + δ (x))
respectively. It is straightforward to check that a decision maker exhibits
diversification preference when f is convex. Now consider the case when the
discount factor δ is close to 1, f needs to be close to the identity function in
order to make the marginal rate of substitution between the consumptions
in period 1 and 2 greater than 1.(f (0.5) > (1− f (0.5)) δ) This suggests
that the effect of probability distortion in creating diversification preference
may not be that strong; i.e., the difference between option A and B may not
be very significant. In our representation, the diversification needs always
exists due to the nature of mean-variance utility function.
Our model differs from the above mentioned models in the way that
we model preference for diversification across time from another perspec-
tive, which is aversion to intertemporal correlation. We would like to note
the following two points on our model. First, our axiomatization is built
upon monetary payoffs, and our representation exhibits perfect intertempo-
ral substitution when there is no risk involved, which surely calls for further
investigation. One can consider some alternative behavioral models without
perfect substitution for deterministic consumptions, which also can capture
2They consider Yaari’s (1987) dual theory in risk, which is similar to rank-dependent
utility (Quiggin, 1982).
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the diversification effect. For example, V (w) = EΘu (
∑
t v (w (t, θ))) , where
u is concave.3 The other point is realted to dynamic inconsistency. Our
model may exhibit preference reversal due to the mean-variance nature util-
ity function, and we show this by an example from Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). Consider the following two choice problems:
1. Choose between A1: consuming 3000 for sure and A2: consuming
4000 with probability 0.8.
2. Choose between B1: consuming 3000 with probability 0.25 and B2:
consuming 4000 with probability 0.2.
It is commonly observed that the subjects prefer A1 in problem 1 and
B2 in problem 2, this preference can be shown to be consistent with mean-
variance utility. Given this, a subject facing intertemporal choice problems


























The last point is that a domain with finite period T makes it easier to
extend the results of quadratic utility in static settings. It would certainly
be interesting to explore preference for diversification in a more complex
domain Z∞ ∼ ∆ (C × Z∞) , which is the set of infinite horizon contingent
consumption plans,4 considering the possible applications of diversification
preference in macroeconomics studies. Such extension would require extend-
ing Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991) to a more general domain first, which is
not straightforward as we need to deal with inifite dimentional vectors. We
would like to leave it to our future research.
3We thank Matthew Rabin for pointing out this model. In fact, this model is essentially
similar as Epstein and Zin (1989).
4One can construct this domain in the usual recursive way as in Kreps and Porteus
(1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989).
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Besides the theoretical relevants, we would like to link our study to some
recent experimental studies. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) recently report
some anomalies of REU. In their experiments, the subjects are asked to
make an allocation of 100 points (exchangeable for money) with different
interest rates r in the following two scenarios
Treatment 1: x in day t and r (100− x) in day t′, both for sure.
Treatment 2: x in day t and r (100− x) in day t′, both with half chance,
independently.
REU predicts that the optimal allocation of x in both cases are the same
due to the “common ratio” effect over time. In detail, the utilities of the
plans in two treatments are u (x)+u (r (100− x)) and 0.5 (u (x) + u (r (100− x)))
respectively under REU. As one differs from the other only by a multiplier
of a positive number, the optimal allocations should coincide.
In their study, they identify significant differences between the alloca-
tions in two treatments, which in general negates REU. They attribute this
anomaly to preference for certainty as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Miao and Zhong (2012) recently add two more treatments similar to the
thought experiment in the beginning of this paper
Treatment 3: x in day t and r (100− x) in day t′ with half chance,
otherwise get nothing.
Treatment 4: x in day t with half chance, otherwise get r (100− x) in
day t′.
They find that the allocations in 3 is similar to that in 1, and allocations
in 4 is similar to that in 2, while the allocations in 1 and 3 differ significantly
from that in 2 and 4. This finding partially supports our intuition for the
difference between option A and B. In addition, their findings suggest the
interpretation in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) may not be accurate since
there are still risks involved in treatment 3, while the behavioral pattern in 3
is similar to that in 1. They later find out their data could be accommodated
by both Epstein and Zin (1989) and Chew and Epstein (1990), and they find
support for different α and ρ in Epstein and Zin (1989) and convex f in Chew
and Epstein (1990) in subsequent structural estimations.5 Our model can
5When α = ρ, Epstein and Zin (1989) reduces to REU.
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also generate similar behavioral patterns as found in their data.6 As we
pointed out before, future joint tests of preference for diversification across
time, preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution, and magnitude of
distortion in probability weighting function would differentiate among these
models.
To conclude, we propose a dynamic mean-variance model to account for
preference for diversification across time as illustrated by our thought ex-
periment. The proposed model can explain some anomalies for discounted
expected utility in recent experimental literature. Further experimental in-
struments could potentially differentiate the proposed model among some
others. The other possible direction of future study involves investigating
diversification preference in a more complex environment with infinite time
horizon.
4.4 Appendix
4.4.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. First we deal with the simple case, where the state space is divided
into S equal measure events. Denote this simplified domain as X(S) and
elements of it as x, also label the payoff in state s and time t as xst. Given
Ordering, Quasiconcavity and Mixture Symmetry, Chew Epstein and Segal
(1991) show that the domain could be partitioned into two regions: the
quadratic region (quasiconcave) and linear region. The utility function in













Additionally, with State Independence, Chew and Sagi (2011) show that










































6In the appendix, we provide a numerical example which shows that our model can
generate the observed differences among treatments.
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We would like to note that Chew and Sagi (2011) obtain the above
representations in a more restricted domain named mean-commontonic cone.
When restricted to this domain, our axiom State Independence coincides
with the axiom Symmetry and State Independence, thus making it possible
to apply Proposition 3 in their paper.
Since we have independence in the dimension of time for constant con-
sumption plans, we have φ̂tt′ + ϕ̂tt′ = 0 for all t, t
′. To see this, fix one
deterministic consumption plan x, and find a constant plan x′ which pays
a constant number of consumption c in every period such that x ∼ x′.





(xt − c) (xt′ − c) = 0. Since this holds for arbitrary x, it
will imply φ̂tt′ + ϕ̂tt′ = 0.






















Moreover, since the set of deterministic allocations are dense in the do-
main (there exist a deterministic allocation x? such that given any allocation
x, we have x? ∼ x.), the representations in two regions must coincide for
deterministic allocations, and thus we have γ̂t = γt. In subsequent, we focus
on the quadratic region and prove proposition 1.
Consider a consumption plan x which pays a constant c in all states
and periods except for st and s′t. Moreover, let xst + xs′t = 2c, and per-
mute x by swapping the consumptions in state s and s′ to get x′. By State
Independence, we have x ∼ x′, and we have x/2 + x′/2  x by Qua-






2y2 − x2st − x2s′t
))
. For this to be always positive, we must have
φ̂tt ≤ 0.
Then, consider a consumption plan x such that xts = xt′s for all s except
for s1 and s2. Moreover, let xts1 = xt′s2 = a and xts2 = xt′s1 = b. Permute
x by swapping x˜t and x˜t′ to get x
′. By Time Independence, we have x ∼ x′.





(a− b) (xs1t′′ − xs2t′′) .
For this to always be 0, we must have φ̂tt′′ = φ̂t′t′′ for all t
′′ 6= t, t′.
Applying the same argument to all t and t′, it implies that all φ̂tt′ are the
















































Now, consider an arbitrary consumption plan x which pays a constant
c in all periods except for t and t′. In addition, let x˜t = x˜t′ . Perturb it by
randomly permuting x˜t′ to get x˜
′
t′ , name the new consumption plan as x
′.






















. In particular, it becomes smaller in x′,
which implies ϕ′ ≤ 0.


























where φ′t, ϕ ≥ 0. Next, we try to build the upper bound for ϕ. Given any
allocation w and a constant allocation w′ that pays constant c such that
w ∼ w′. By Quasiconcavity again, we have αw+ (1−α)w′  w, subtracting

























and this has to be always greater than 0. Note that we can fix
∑
t w˜t to be




t − ϕ) var (w˜t) ≥ 0, and
this will further imply that there exist at most one t?, such that φ′t?−ϕ < 0.
Otherwise, suppose for t and t′ we have φ′t − ϕ < 0, then we can make w
a constant c′ in all periods except for t, t′, and w˜t + w˜t′ = 2c′, we will have
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t − ϕ) var (w˜t) ≥ 0
and
∑
t w˜t = c
?, we will have a lower bound for φ′t? − ϕ, which will be
























where φt = φ
′
t − ϕ. Moreover, we have γ1 > γ2... > γT by Discounting.
Monotonicity in B1 additionally requires all the γ being positive and impose
an upper bound for φt and ϕ. The calculations are straightforward, and we
must have φt + Tϕ ≤ γtm . Hence, we have the sufficiency for proposition 1.
It is straightforward to verify the necessity, so we ignore it here.
4.4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. The result is straightforward given Proposition 1, and we skip the
proof here.
4.4.3 Numerical Example
When there are two periods, we use the model: V (w) = (E (w˜1)− φvar (w˜2))+
β (E (w˜2)− φvar (w˜2))−ϕvar (w˜1 + w˜2) , where β is the discount factor be-
tween two periods. The following is the optimal allocations in different
treatments with the parameters φ = 0.0001, β = 0.98 and ϕ = 0.0048.
Figure 4.1: Optimal Allocations in Different Treatments.
Solid line: Optimal allocations of x in treatments 1,3.
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Dashed Line: Optimal allocations of x in treatment 2.
Dotted line: Optimal allocations of x in treatment 4.
Note that there exist corner solutions in treatments 1 and 3, and the
decision maker exhibit switching point behavior due to the perfect substi-
tution effect for constant consumption plans. While in treatments 2 and 4,
the allocations are more smooth. Thus, there exists the cross over effect as






Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, henceforth GP) develop an axiomatic work on
temptation using a menu preference framework with a key axiom named
Set Betweenness, which captures the idea that agent might be tempted by
extra choices even though they are aware of that those are not optimal. In
their representation, there exists one state of temptation which may cause a
drop of the value for a set when added in more alternatives. Stovall (2010)
generalizes their work to model the situation where agents are subject to
multiple temptations, with two weaker axioms substituting Set Betweenness:
Inclusion and Exclusion.
In dynamic environment, GP (2004) explore temptation on the domain of
infinite horizon consumption plans (IHCPs), and obtain a recursive tempta-
tion representation. In this note, we assume multiple temptations represen-
tation on IHCPs and extend GP (2004) to show the existence of a recursive
multiple temptations representation by modifying some of GP (2004) ax-
ioms. With these axioms, Theorem 1 characterizes the following Recursive










(u (c) + vi (c) + δW (z
′)) dµ (c, z′)
−maxµ∈z
∫
vi (c) dµ (c, z
′)
}
where δ ∈ (0, 1) , qi > 0 for all i,
∑
i qi = 1, and u and each vi are contin-
uous functions. For a singleton plan, W ({x}) = ∫ (u (c)+δW (z′))dµ (c, z′) ,
which is a classical recursive utility representation. Hence, u represents the
instant normative preference and each i could be interpreted as different
states in which agents are subject to different temptations vi.
In the remaining of this chapter, we introduce the model and the axioms,
followed by discussions of related literature and how our model deviate from
GP (2004).
5.2 Setup
We adopt GP (2004) framework to define the domain for preferences, which
is IHCPs. Let C be the compact set of consumptions and Z the domain.
For any compact set S, Let ∆ (S) denote the set of all probability measures
on S endowed with weak topology and let K (S) denote the set of nonempty
compact subsets of S endowed with Hausdorff metric. GP (2004) show that
Z can be identified with K (∆ (C × Z)) and it is a well-defined compact
space. In the remaining of this chapter, we use x, y,or z to denote elements
of Z and µ, ν, or η to denote elements of ∆ (C × Z). The following are some








} ∼ {12 (c, z′) + 12 (c′, z)}.
Axiom 2 (Stationarity) {(c, x)}  {(c, y)} iff x  y.
Axiom 3 (Indifference to Timing) {α (c, x) + (1− α) (c, y)} ∼ {(x, αx+ (1− α) y)}.
Axiom 4 (Temptation by Immediate Consumption) ν1 = η1, x  x∪{ν} 
{ν} and x  x ∪ {η}  {η} imply x ∪ {ν} ∼ x ∪ {η}.
Our Axiom 4 implies Axiom 8 of GP (2004), the reason for having
a stronger axiom is due to the existence of multiple temptation states,
which makes separating different temptation states difficult compared to
GP (2004). In order to get recursive representation, we need one more
restriction on multiple temptations functional.
Regularity A multiple temptations representation is said to be regular
if U + Vi is not a linear (including 0) transformation of Vj for any i, j.
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This regularity condition is not explicitly mentioned in GP (2004), al-
though it must be satisfied to guarantee that U and V can be separated.
When there is one single state of temptation as in GP (2004), this regularity
condition becomes V 6= αU + β for any α 6= 0. GP (2004) is free from this
condition since it violates the non-degeneracy of temptation. since the valu-
ation of a set only depends on the optimal (in terms of either U or V ) choice
if this condition holds. When there exist multiple states of temptations, we
still need to impose this condition. Next we state our main theorem:
Theorem 5.1 A regular multiple temptations representation attains a RMT
representation if  satisfies Axioms 1-4.
Moreover, we also have the following impossibility result.
Proposition 5.2 An irregular multiple temptations representation can not
be expressed into RMT.
5.3 Related Literature
GP (2001) framework is on a simple domain K (∆ (X)), where X is a com-
pact metric space. With common axioms of weak order, continuity, inde-
pendence and the following key axiom (where A,B ∈ K)
Axiom 5 (Set Betweenness) A  B implies A  A ∪B  B.
They obtain the seminal temptation representation in a static environ-
ment: w (A) = maxµ∈A [u (µ) + v (µ)] − maxν∈A v (ν) , where u and v are
expected utility functions defined on ∆ (X).
Since the set C×Z defined as in Section 2 is also compact, it is straight-
forward for GP (2004) to generalize this representation to the domain of
IHCPs with similar axioms and obtain the following representation on this
new domain
W (z) = maxµ∈z [U (µ) + V (µ)]−maxν∈z V (ν) .
GP (2004) additionally impose few more axioms similar to 1-4 to de-
scribe individual intertemporal preferences and obtain recursive temptation
representation
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W (z) = max
µ∈z
∫ (















Stovall (2010) extends GP (2001) in the other way, he works on a simpler
domain by restricting X to be a finite set. He adopts weaker axioms instead
of Set Betweenness
Axiom 5a (Exclusion) If {β}  {α} for every β ∈ x, then x  x∪{α}.
Axiom 5b (Inclusion) If {α}  {β} for every β ∈ x, then x∪{α}  x.
Together with a finiteness condition (which guarantees finiteness of con-




i=1 qi {maxβ∈A [u (β) + vi (β)]−maxβ∈A vi (β)}.
With an even weaker version of Betweenness, DLR (2007) obtain a more











]−∑Ji maxβ∈A vj (β)} .
DL (2010) generalize Stovall (2010) through the other channel by drop-
ping the finiteness axiom and restricting the preference to be Lipschitz con-
tinuous to allow for the existence of a continuum of temptation states
w (A) =
∫ {maxβ∈A [u (β) + v (β)]−maxβ∈A v (β)} ν (dv) ,
where ν is a measure over VNM functions v.
However, it is not straightforward that how these works (Stovall (2010),
DLR (2007, 2010)) could be extended to the domain of IHCPs due to the fact
that the domain of the preference in these works are built upon K (∆ (X))
where X is finite, while in GP (2004) the domain of IHCPs is naturally
compact. The difficulties are on extending convex analysis results for finite
sets to compact sets. Nevertheless, our focus in this chapter is to develop a
recursive representation involving multiple temptations, while assuming the
existence of multiple temptations representation on the domain of IHCPs,
and we shall leave the above extensions to our future work.
5.4 Discussion
GP (2004) give an interesting example of how dynamic inconsistency may
arise assuming recursive temptation preferences. The intuition is simple,
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consider the following example consisting of 2 menus of consumption plans
for α < β.
• menu 1: {(α, 0, 0, 0, 0...) , (0, β, 0, 0, 0...)} ,
• menu 2: {(0, 0, α, 0, 0...) , (0, 0, 0, β, 0...)} .
Basically, the choices in 2 are obtained by postponing 1 choices for 2 pe-
riods. Since temptation from alternatives occurs through their first margins,
choosing delayed consumption β in menu 1 may suffer from a temptation
loss from the presence of alternative immediate consumption α, while choos-
ing β in menu 2 does not suffer such a loss. Hence, it is possible to choose
immediate consumption α in 1 and delayed consumption β in 2. Under such
circumstance, the decision maker would exhibits preference for self control
but no preference for commitment, that is
{(0, β, 0, 0, 0...)}
 {(α, 0, 0, 0, 0...) , (0, β, 0, 0, 0...)}
∼ {(α, 0, 0, 0, 0...)} .
RMT suggests that even when the decision maker has a preference for
commitment, which means {(α, 0, 0, 0, 0...) , (0, β, 0, 0, 0...)}  {(α, 0, 0, 0, 0...)} ,
we may still observe preference reversals. This difference is due to uncer-
tainty of temptation states. Suppose there exists two possible states, i.e.
temptation free state and irresistible temptation state, such that in the first
state the decision maker is not subject to any temptation while in the latter
one he is unable to resist any temptation1, then we may observe preference
reversal and preference for commitment concurrently. The reason is, now
the decision maker is not sure about whether he could resist the temptation
when making a choice, then he would ”exhibit” preference for commitment
at ex-ante level while he may still have reversal problems condition on which
state he is subject to when making the choice. Hence, RMT allows prefer-
ence reversals in a more general environment, which could be tested in the
future by experimental instruments.
The other interesting thing is GP (2004) only allows alternatives to tempt
the decision maker through their first margins. Hence the same argument
before would not apply for the following example to accommodate preference
reversal, which is an observed phenomenon in Chew et al (2010).
1Strictly speaking, this assumption violates regularity. However, the ideas work for
general regular multiple temptations preference.
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• menu 1’: {(0, α, 0, 0, 0...) , (0, 0, β, 0, 0...)} ,
• menu 2’: {(0, 0, α, 0, 0...) , (0, 0, 0, β, 0...)} .
A closer examination of the functional forms of GP (2004) and RMT
suggests that choice within a set is actually determined by the first half
of the utility function simply because the second half only depends on the
set itself but not the choices made. Therefore, choice within a set in GP
(2004) is arg maxµ∈z
∫
(u (c) + v (c) + δW (z′)) dµ (c, z′) , while in RMT it
is arg maxµ∈z
∫
(u (c) + vi (c) + δW (z
′)) dµ (c, z′) for some state i. Unfortu-
nately, since our intermediate representation is not different from GP (2004),
prediction of RMT regarding within-set choice would be similar to GP (2004)
once the state is revealed. Indeed, RMT also fails to explain preference re-
versal in the second example. One way to tackle this is to consider Noor
(2007) recursive stationary temptation representation (RST).
W (z) = max
µ∈z
∫ (























The intuition for Noor (2007) to account for dynamic inconsistency in a
more general environment like the second example is: now temptation loss
occurs whenever the delayed consumption β is chosen in 1’ or 2’. However,
if this temptation loss is discounted at a higher rate γ compared to the
discounting rate δ of utility from consuming β, then the impact of temptation
becomes relatively weaker when both choices are postponed by the same
periods, thus making it possible for the decision maker to choose α in 1’
and β in 2’. Noor (2007) is more general than GP (2004) in the sense that
temptation from alternatives may also arise from their continued stream
while our current work allows for several alternatives to tempt the decision
maker through their first margins simultaneously. Indeed, in the appendix,
we give a partial characterization that could deliver the following recursive









(u (c) + vi (c) + δW (z
′) + γiV (z′)) dµ (c, z′)
−maxµ∈z
∫
(vi (c) + γiV (z
′)) dµ (c, z′)
}
and this representation can accommodate for both directions of general-
ity mentioned in this section.
To conclude, this chapter generalizes the recursive temptation represen-
tation to include multiple temptations within each period. It also explores
the implications of uncertain temptations on dynamic inconsistency in more
general environments. Possible future works may involve extending static
temptation results to general domain where the outcome set is compact.
5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Lemma 5.3 There exits a continuous u : C → R, δ ∈ (0, 1) , and γ ∈
R such that U (µ) =
∫
(u (c) + δW (z)) dµ (c, z) + γ for all µ ∈ ∆ (C × Z).
Proof. Proof of this Lemma almost resembles GP (2004). One can refer to
their paper to construct a similar argument.
Before we show the separability of Vi, we show the following lemma first.
Lemma 5.4 Fix two nontrivial functions Vi, Vj which do not represent the
same preference and µ ∈ ∆ with full support, we can find µˆ sufficiently close
to µ, such that Vi (µ) > Vi (µˆ) and Vj (µˆ) > Vi (µ) .
Proof. First we identify two continuous functions vi, vj such that Vi (η) =∫
vidη and Vj (η) =
∫









v2jdµ = 1 after normalization.
In order to find µ′ such that
∫
vidµ
′ < 0 and
∫
vjdµ
′ > 0. We first find
a continuous function v such that
∫
vivdµ < 0 and
∫
vjvdµ > 0.







































could be seemed as the correla-
tion between vi and vj , and it should be less than 1 if they are not perfectly
correlated. Hence v′ is the function we are looking for.









′. In fact, µ′ (E) =
∫
E vdµ.
Since µ is of full support, we can make µ′ a well defined probability
measure by dividing
vj−vi
2 by N large enough.
Then, by linearity and continuity, setting µˆ = αµ′+(1− α)µ for α small
and we have the lemma.
Lemma 5.5 There exists a continuous vi : C → R such that Vi (µ) =∫
vi (c) dµ (c, z) for all i ∈ I and for all µ ∈ ∆.
Proof. Claim 1: There exists a finite partition {I1, I2...IJ , IJ+1} of I such
that for all i, j ∈ Il, Vi = αiVj for some positive scalar αi. And for all i ∈
IJ+1, Vi is constant. Moreover, Vi from different partitions do not represent
the same preference.
Proof of Claim 1: See Stovall(2010).
Claim 2: For Vi such that i /∈ IJ+1, there exists µi, ηi ∈ ∆ such that µi i
{µi, ηi} i ηi, where idenotes the preference represented by max (U + Vi)−
maxVi.
Proof of Claim 2: This follows from the fact that Vi 6= αU for any
positive scalar α and for all i ∈ I (see Stovall (2010)). Stovall (2010) still
allows Vj = −U for some j. However, this is impossible from regularity
condition. For the case i ∈ IJ+1, Vi is constant and the lemma trivially
holds. Hence we do not consider trivial Vi in the remaining of this proof.
If we do not consider the above scenarios, then U + Vi and Vi do not
represent the same preference, and the result follows from GP (2004). By
continuity, we can assume ηi has full support without loss of generality.
Now, Take any i? ∈ Im such that Vi? is nontrivial, there exist µi? , ηi? ∈ ∆
such that {µi?} i? {µi? , ηi?} i? {ηi?} . This will imply the following
(a) U (µi?) > U (ηi?)
(b) (U + Vi?) (µi?) > (U + Vi?) (ηi?)
(c) Vi? (µi?) < Vi? (ηi?)
Next we show the Lemma from step 1 to 4.
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First, we use (U + Vi) (x) to denote the maximum value of (U + Vi)
attained in x, similar for U and Vi.
Step 1: There exists a finite set yηi? within the − neighborhood of ηi? ,
such that









> Vj (ηi?) for all j /∈ Im or IJ+1.




> (U + Vi) (ηi?) for all i /∈ IJ+1.
Proof of Step 1: From Lemma 2, fixing Vi? and Vj for j /∈ Im or IJ+1,
we can find a point ηj , such that Vi? (ηi?) > Vi? (ηj) and Vj (ηj) > Vj (ηi?) .
Moreover, from regularity condition, fixing Vi? and U + Vi for any i, we can
find ηi such that Vi? (ηi?) > Vi? (ηi) and (U + Vi) (ηi) > (U + Vi) (ηi?) .
Hence, let the set yηi? = {ηj : j /∈ Im or IJ+1}∪{ηi : i ∈ I}, then we have
the result.




of I \ IJ+1, such that









(U + Vi) (µi?) for i ∈ I2.
Proof of Step 2: Take I1 = {i : (U + Vi) (ηi?) ≥ (U + Vi) (µi?)} and for













Vi (µi?) for all i ∈ I4. Also note that (U + Vi) (ηi?) > (U + Vi) (µi?) implies
Vi (ηi?) > Vi (µi?) since we have U (µi?) > U (ηi?) . Hence we have I
1 ⊆ I3
and I4 ⊆ I2.
Step 3: For  small enough, {µi?} ∪ yηi?  {µi? , ηi?} ∪ yηi?  {ηi?}.
Proof of Step 3: First we show the first strict preference is true.
For  small enough we have∑
pi maxµ∈{µi?}∪yηi? (U + Vi) (µ)
=
∑






j∈I2 pj (U + Vj) (µi?)
=
∑
pi maxµ∈{µi? ,ηi?}∪yηi? (U + Vi) (µ) .
The second equality is true due to (c) of step 1. Hence, the maximum
attained by (U + Vj) will not change if we add ηi? into the menu {µi?}∪yηi? .
In addition, adding ηi? strictly increases the second part
∑
pi maxVi (µ)
since Vi? (actually all Vi for i ∈ Im) now attains a greater value, hence we
have the first strict preference.
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> U (ηi?) .
Now take any ν ∈ ∆, By continuity, there exists β > 0 small enough




























> U (βv + (1− β) ηi?) .
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which is equivalent to {µi?} ∪ yηi?  {µi?} ∪ yηi? ∪ {βv + (1− β) ηi?} 
{βv + (1− β) ηi?} .
Note that this is true for all ν ∈ ∆. In particular, for all ν, η ∈ ∆ such
that ν1 = η1, we have
{µi?} ∪ yηi?  {µi? , βv + (1− β) ηi?} ∪ yηi?  {βv + (1− β) ηi?} , and
{µi?} ∪ yηi?  {µi? , βη + (1− β) ηi?} ∪ yηi?  {βη + (1− β) ηi?} .
By axiom 4, this implies
{µi? , βv + (1− β) ηi?} ∪ yηi? ∼ {µi? , βη + (1− β) ηi?} ∪ yηi? .
Hence, we have
∑
i∈Im Vi (βv + (1− β) η?) =
∑
i∈Im Vi (βη + (1− β) η?) .
By claim 1, we know that for all j ∈ Im, we have Vj = γjVi? for some









Vi? (βη + (1− β) ηi?)
which implies Vi? (βv + (1− β) ηi?) = Vi? (βη + (1− β) ηi?) ∀ν, η ∈ ∆ such
that ν1 = η1.
Since Vi is linear, we have Vi? (ν) = Vi? (η) . Hence we have the lemma
for any i ∈ Im.
We can extend this argument to all i ∈ I \ IJ+1.
To conclude, we can show in a similar way to GP (2004) that such utility
function W is unique, hence we have Theorem 1.
5.5.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Assume that an irregular multiple temptations representation could be ex-
pressed into RMT. If U + Vi 6= 0, then there must exist some i, j such
that:∫
(u (c) + vi (c) + δW (z
′)) dµ (c, z′) = α
∫
vj (c) dµ (c, z
′) + β for some
α, β such that α 6= 0.
But this could not be generally true due to the nondegeneracy of  .
Similar argument applies to the case when Vi = −U .
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5.5.3 Recursive Stationary Multiple temptations
Let ∆s (Z) denote the set of all measures on Z with finite support and define
function ϕ : ∆s (Z) → Z as ϕ (
∑
p (x) δx) =
∑
p (x)x, the corresponding
set valued function ϕ′ : K (∆s (Z))→ K (Z) is defined in usual way.
Axiom 3’ (Indifference to Timing) For any x, y ∈ K (∆s) and η, ν ∈
∆s, if x
















, then x ∪
{η} ∼ y ∪ {ν} .
Axiom 4’ (Contingent Temptation Stationarity) x i x∪y ⇔ {(c, x)} i
{(c, x) , (c, y)} .
Proposition 5.6 A regular multiple temptations representation attains RSMT
representation if  satisfies Axiom 2, 3’ and 4’.
Proof. In order to simplify the proof, we first assume that Vi is not an
affine transformation of Vj for any j 6= i. Then, similar to what we have
shown in Lemma 3, now it is possible to separate a single Vi for a regular*
multiple temptations representation. By which we mean the following
Step 1: For any i, there exists xi and µi in K (∆s) such that xi 
xi ∪ {µi}  {µi} and xi i xi ∪ {µi} i {µi} . Moreover Vj (xi) > Vj (µi)
and (U + Vj) (xi) > (U + Vj) (µi) for any j 6= i.
Proof of Step 1: see proof for lemma 3. Note that xi, µ may not belong
to K (∆s) in Lemma 3. However, since ∆s is dense in ∆, we have the result
without loss of generality.
Moreover, we have the following by continuity
xi  xi ∪{αLν + (1− αL)µi}  {αLν + (1− αL)µi} for any ν ∈ L ⊂ ∆






















′, z′) and ν2 = 12 (c, z
′)+ 12 (c
′, z) .
By step 1, there exist xi, µi and α such that
xi  xi ∪ {αν1 + (1− α)µi}  {αν1 + (1− α)µi} , and
xi  xi ∪ {αν2 + (1− α)µi}  {αν2 + (1− α)µi} .
All the above measures have finite support, and (αν1 + (1− α)µi)1 =
(αν2 + (1− α)µi)1 , also it is not difficult to check that ϕ
(





(αν2 + (1− α)µi)2
)
, hence xi∪{αν1 + (1− α)µi} ∼ xi∪{αν2 + (1− α)µi}
by Axiom 3’.
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By step 1 again, we know that only Vi attains its maximum on αν1 +
(1− α)µi for α small, hence Vi
(
1













Step 3: There exists continuous functions vi : C → R, Vˆi : Z → R such
that Vi (µ) =
∫ (
vi (c) + Vˆi (x)
)
dµ (c, x) ∀µ ∈ ∆.
Proof of Step 3: From step 2, the proof is similar to step 1 of Lemma 1 if
we define vi : C × Z → R such that Vi (µ) =
∫
vidµ, then the result follows
by setting vi (c) = vi (c, x¯)− vi (c¯, x¯) and Vˆi (x) = vi (c¯, x) for some c¯ and x¯.
Step 4: Vi (α (c, z) + (1− α) (c, z′)) = Vi ((c, αz + (1− α) z′)) .
Proof of Step 4: Take ν1 = α (c, z)+(1− α) (c, z′) , ν2 = (c, αz + (1− α) z′) .
Again, by step 1, there exists xi, µi and β such that
xi  xi ∪ {βν1 + (1− β)µi}  {βν1 + (1− β)µi} , and
xi  xi ∪ {βν2 + (1− β)µi}  {βν2 + (1− β)µi} .
By similar argument, xi ∪ {βν1 + (1− β)µi} ∼ xi ∪ {βν2 + (1− β)µi} .
Hence, Vi (α (c, z) + (1− α) (c, z′)) = Vi ((c, αz + (1− α) z′)) by linearity.
Step 5: Vˆi is linear.
Proof of Step 5: From step 4, we have
Vi (α (c, z) + (1− α) (c, z′)) = Vi ((c, αz + (1− α) z′))
=⇒ α
(




vi (c) + Vˆi (z
′)
)
= vi (c)+Vˆi (αz + (1− α) z′)
=⇒ αVˆi (z) + (1− α) Vˆi (z′) = Vˆi (αz + (1− α) z′) .
Hence we have the result.
Step 6: Vi is linear and continuous.
Proof of Step 6: See Lemma A.7 and A.8 in Noor (2007).
Step 7: For all x, y, Vi (y) > Vi (x)⇐⇒ Vˆi (y) > Vˆi (x) .
Proof of Step 7: Since Axiom 4’ directly works on individual temptation
preference i, then we have the following result from Noor (2007).
If x i y, then Vi (y) > Vi (x) ⇐⇒ Vˆi (y) > Vˆi (x) . Next we extend this
result to all x, y.
For the direction of ”=⇒”, suppose y i x and Vi (x) ≥ Vi (y) . By step
1, there exists w, z such that w i z and Vi (w) < Vi (z) . By linearity of W
and Vi, we have the following for all α ∈ (0, 1) .
a. αy + (1− α)w i αx+ (1− α) z
b. Vi (αy + (1− α)w) < Vi (αx+ (1− α) z)
Apply the result from Noor (2007) and we shall get Vˆi (αx+ (1− α) z) >
Vˆi (αy + (1− α)w) for all α ∈ (0, 1) . Continuity of Vˆi will then imply
Vˆi (x) > Vˆi (y) .
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One can show the other direction in a similar way.
Step 8: There exists 1 > γi > 0 and θi ∈ R such that Vˆι (x) = γiVi (x)+θi
for all x ∈ Z.
Proof of Step 8: Existence of γi > 0 and θi comes from the cardinal
equivalence between Vˆi and Vi established in step 7, together with linearity
and continuity of Vˆi, Vi from Step 3, 5 and 6.
Now we show that γi < 1.
Again, we define the same consumption plans yn and zc as in Step 3 of
Lemma 1 such that Vi (z) 6= Vi (zc). Moreover, From Step 1, we have for α
small, xi  xi ∪ {αzc + (1− α)µi}  {αzc + (1− α)µi} .
yn → zc implies xi ∪ {αyn + (1− α)µi} → xi ∪ {αzc + (1− α)µi} and
{αyn + (1− α)µi} → {αzc + (1− α)µi} . Hence there exists an N such that
for all n ≥ N, we have xi  xi ∪ {αyn + (1− α)µi}  {αyn + (1− α)µi} .
Note that all the above strict preferences also hold for i by step 1, and
only Vi attains a higher value at αz
c + (1− α)µi. Then we have
W (xi ∪ {αyn + (1− α)µi})−W (xi ∪ {αzc + (1− α)µi})→ 0
⇒ Vi (yn)− Vi (zc)→ 0
=⇒ γn (Vi (z)− Vi (zc))→ 0
Since Vi (z) 6= Vi (zc) by construction, we have γi < 1.
Again, with out loss of generality, we can set θi = 0 and note that the
above argument also works for the case that there is a set of Vi representing
the same preference. Applying the same argument in Noor (2007) to get the
uniqueness of W and then we have the proposition.
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